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This dissertation analyzes macroeconomic effects of ex-ante information ac-
quisition problems between lenders and borrowers in credit markets. It examines
the ways in which the costs associated with the screening of privately informed het-
erogeneous loan applicants affect contractual arrangements, efficient allocation of
credit and macroeconomic fluctuations. Screening costs can take on two different
forms: i) the direct costs incurred by borrowers through collateral requirements and
credit limits, ii) the resource costs incurred by lenders for spending time, effort and
money on screening loan applicants, which are passed on to borrowers through higher
loan rates. This dissertation is organized into two parts, analyzing macroeconomic
implications of these two types of screening costs.
In the first chapter, entitled “Collateralization, Credit Allocation and Invest-
ment Dynamics”, we focus on the case where screening can be achieved by collateral
requirements and credit limits. We analyze how changes in collateral availability af-
fect aggregate investment and output dynamics through the misallocation of bank
credit across heterogeneous investors. We develop a theoretical model of the credit
market where banks cannot fully assess the credit risk of investors, and collateral ca-
pacity of investors becomes crucial in the design of financial contracts that facilitate
efficient allocation of credit.
In the proposed framework, there are observable and unobservable components
to a borrower/investor’s credit risk. Banks are able to group borrowers into risk
classes based on their observable characteristics such as their collateral capacity.
However, within a quality group there are still higher and lower risk borrowers
that cannot be observationally distinguished. For any group of borrowers with
common observable quality, banks may design either pooling or separating contracts.
Pooling contracts offer efficient loan amounts but entail cross subsidization of high
risk borrowers, while separating contracts offer efficient loan rates but entail credit
rationing of low risk borrowers. We show that a financial shock that reduces the
collateral capacity of borrowers may switch the financial contracts designed for low
quality borrowers from pooling to separating, which increases credit rationing within
low quality group and reallocates credit in favor of high quality borrowers. Thus,
our framework generates a flight to quality in bank lending, which is documented
in the empirical literature to precede the recessions and predict future reductions
in real GDP. This flight to quality occurs in our framework because banks tighten
credit standards, or the terms of financial contracts, more for relatively risky or low
quality borrowers when financial conditions worsen. The differential access to credit
across these investors decreases aggregate investment efficiency and real economic
activity.
In the second chapter, entitled “Costly Screening in Credit Markets, Net Worth
Effects and Business Cycles”, we focus on the case where screening can be achieved
by incurring resource costs. We build a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring
costly screening of loan applicants to examine how aggregate shocks are amplified
and propagated through net worth effects compared to a standard model of ex-post
monitoring costs, which has become the work-horse framework to analyze macro-
financial linkages.
In the model, loan applicants tend to hide the prospects of their projects absent
screening, and lenders have access to a costly screening technology to evaluate the
creditworthiness of loan applicants, which is a way to economize on the agency costs
induced by pooling all borrowers, but is an agency cost in and of itself, making
loan terms, and in turn investment, dependent on borrower net worth. Borrower
screening is inversely proportional to borrower net worth: as the borrower’s stake
in investment rises the need for screening falls. When borrower net worth is low,
borrowers are subject to higher screening; and since screening costs are passed on
to borrowers through higher loan rates, lower net worth increases the cost and
decreases the availability of external funding. When there is an adverse aggregate
productivity shock, borrower income or net worth falls and external finance becomes
more expensive. As a result, both internal and external sources of finance shrink,
decreasing aggregate investment and output, and further decreasing borrower net
worth. In this way aggregate shocks are propagated through their effects on borrower
net worth. Thus, we show that the costly screening framework can be an alternative
to widely assumed monitoring costs in generating net worth effects that enhance
the propagation of aggregate shocks. One advantage of the screening framework
is that it yields wealth effects that induce persistent dynamics especially in bad
times when borrower screening is more likely, which may create longer and deeper
busts than booms. In addition to that, by yielding efficient risk pricing and quantity
rationing endogenously as in actual bank lending practices, the screening framework
constitutes an empirically plausible alternative to monitoring costs to motivate the
agency costs in unsecured lending.
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Chapter 1
Collateralization, Credit Allocation and Investment Dynamics
1.1 Introduction
Macroeconomic studies of credit market imperfections, following the seminal
works of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), have pri-
marily emphasized the role of borrower net worth or collateral capacity in shaping
aggregate investment and output dynamics through the volume of credit obtained
by a representative investor in the economy. The focus of this paper is to examine
how changes in collateral capacity affect aggregate investment and output dynamics
through the allocation of credit across heterogeneous investors.
It is now well known that credit market imperfections may enhance the prop-
agation and amplification of exogenous productivity shocks.1 Matsuyama (2007)
argues that the allocation of credit might matter because some aggregate produc-
tivity changes may be caused by an endogenous shift in the allocation of credit
across investors with different productivity levels. This paper builds a theoretical
framework in which lower collateralization may lead to a recession through ineffi-
cient reallocation of credit towards high quality investors, due to tighter screening
and credit rationing of low quality investors by banks. Thus, a financial shock that
reduces the collateral capacity of investors, such as an increase in uncertainty over
1See Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) among many others.
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investment returns, translates into an adverse productivity shock through a flight
to quality in bank lending across investors.
We construct a model of financial contracting under adverse selection and
limited collateral. Groups of investors with different observable quality, i.e., with
different average productivity and average risk rating, finance investment projects
through bank loans, pledging part of their projects. Borrower risk is private infor-
mation within a quality group, which leads banks to design financial contracts that
may either pool borrowers with common observable quality independent of unob-
servable risk, or separate relatively high and low risk borrowers. For a group of
borrowers with common observable quality, a pooling contract offers the efficient
(full information) loan amount, but the pooling loan rate entails cross subsidization
of high risk borrowers by the low risk ones. On the contrary, separating contracts
offer type specific efficient loan rates, but screening entails credit rationing of low
risk borrowers, which disincentivizes high risk borrowers from pretending to be low
risk. The main finding is that a fall in the collateral capacity of investors, among
other model primitives, may switch the financial contracts designed for low quality
investors from pooling to separating, which leads to an inefficient reallocation of
credit in favor of high quality investors, because of tighter screening and credit ra-
tioning of low quality investors by banks. This flight to quality in bank lending due
to tightening credit standards reduces aggregate investment efficiency and thereby
real economic activity.
Both cross subsidization in a pooling regime and credit rationing in a separat-
ing regime hurt low risk borrowers and benefit high risk borrowers within a quality
2
group. As a result, the equilibrium lending regime for borrowers with common ob-
servable quality is determined by whether pooling or separating contracts are more
profitable for low risk borrowers. Consider the situation in which there is only one
quality group of borrowers, and a low risk borrower in this group is indifferent be-
tween a pooling and a separating contract, which constitutes a regime switching
point. When investment technology is decreasing returns to scale, i.e., project re-
turns are concave in funds, a pooling regime yields higher physical investment than
a separating regime at the regime switching point. Therefore, a pooling regime
generates higher future capital, output and lending in the economy. The reason is
that, given the amount of available funds, high risk borrowers in a separating regime
over-invest while low risk borrowers under-invest in capital production compared to
a pooling regime due to credit rationing. Thus, for a given level of resources devoted
to the investment technology, a separating regime yields lower aggregate physical
investment than a pooling regime, slowing economic growth.
Empirical work by Asea and Blomberg (1998) and Lown and Morgan (2006)
document that bank lending standards for allocating business loans systematically
change over the cycle between tightness and laxity, and significantly affect eco-
nomic activity. In these studies, tighter standards are associated with greater use of
non-price loan terms, such as collateral requirements and credit limits, and greater
variance in the loan rates charged by the banks. The latter work, in particular, finds
that tighter standards are usually followed by slower loan growth and often precede
recessions. Switches between pooling and separating regimes in the model can be
interpreted as switches between lax and tight lending standards. A pooling regime
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is a lax lending regime as it eliminates credit rationing and stimulates aggregate
investment, which generates higher output and lending. A separating regime is a
tight lending regime, which promotes efficient risk pricing at the expense of credit
rationing, dampening aggregate investment, future output and lending.
Competitive banks in equilibrium will offer a menu of separating contracts
to borrowers with common observable quality whenever cross subsidization under
pooling becomes relatively more costly for low risk borrowers than credit rationing
in terms of lost profits. The paper shows that the relative cost of cross subsidization
increases in the relative riskiness and measure of high risk borrowers, and decreases
in the degree of collateralization and the curvature of investment technology. A fall
in the collateral capacity of investors increases expected bank losses when borrowers
fail to repay, which increases loan rates as competitive banks need to compensate
for these losses. For a given fall in collateralization, banks need to increase loan
rates more for higher risk borrowers, as they fail and lose collateral more often.
Thus, the loan rate under pooling increases more than the separating loan rate for
a low risk borrower, increasing the degree of cross subsidization under a pooling
regime. On the other hand, it is also true that the separating loan rate for high
risk borrowers increases more than the separating loan rate for low risk borrowers,
further incentivizing high risk borrowers more to pretend to be low risk. In this
case, banks need to ration credit more for low risk borrowers in a separating regime
in order to disincentivize high risk borrowers. Unless investment technology is “too
concave”, lower collateralization makes a separating contract more attractive for a
low risk borrower despite credit rationing, because a lower loan size does not hurt
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profits as much as a higher loan price when the marginal return on investment is
not too high. Thus, a low risk borrower optimally trades off a lower loan amount
for a lower loan rate because the cost of obtaining the efficient loan amount due
to cross subsidization becomes too high. Thereby, lower collateralization increases
the likelihood of a separating regime, and can either tighten an existing separating
regime with a higher degree of credit rationing or switch a pooling regime into
separating.
The paper shows that when there is a financial shock that reduces the collateral
capacity of investors, banks switch to separating low quality investors first, which
leads to a reallocation of credit towards high quality investors, in line with the
stylized fact referred to as a flight to quality in bank lending. Accordingly, credit
flows away from borrowers subject to higher agency costs, and flows in favor of
higher quality borrowers in bad times or when borrower balance sheets deteriorate.2
Asea and Blomberg (1998) document that the proportion of high quality bank loans
(relatively safe loans) increases in periods with a high variance across loan rates
charged by banks, suggesting that a flight to quality occurs when there is tighter
separating across borrowers by banks. Moreover, both Lang and Nakamura (1995)
and Asea and Blomberg (1998) document that increases in the proportion of safe
bank loans are associated with future reductions in real economic activity.3 The
2See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) for a review of evidence on a flight to quality.
3Section 1.6.2 documents similar findings using data from the Survey of Terms of Business
Lending, showing that decreases in the proportion of risky bank loans are highly predictive of
future reductions in real GDP.
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model in this paper features multiple groups of borrowers that differ in expected
productivity and average risk levels (quality), which are publicly observable. We
assume that higher quality borrowers can pledge project returns more easily as they
are subject to lower agency costs. Within each quality group there are two types of
borrowers, high and low risk, that cannot be observationally distinguished. When
there is a financial shock that reduces the collateral capacity of all investors, banks
switch to separating low quality borrowers first, as they are subject to higher agency
costs. Therefore, whenever credit flows from (unobservably) low risk borrowers to
high risk borrowers within the same quality group, due to a regime switch from
pooling to separating for this group, the increased inefficiency affects the relative
creditworthiness among different quality groups, causing credit to flow to observably
higher quality groups with lower average risk levels. Thus, when financing conditions
deteriorate, credit standards tighten more for low quality borrowers, which leads to
a flight to quality. The inefficient reallocation of credit within and between quality
groups decreases aggregate investment efficiency and in turn real economic activity.
Collateralization is defined here as the value of available collateral relative
to the cost of the loan. It depends positively on the pledgeability of a project
and negatively on the loan size, which in turn increases in the expected return on
investment projects. Consider a financial shock that increases the uncertainty in
investment returns, keeping the expected return on investment constant. This re-
duces the pledgeable investment returns, which means that the expected recovery
rate of the loan in case of default falls. As a fall in the pledgeability of projects
decreases collateralization, the uncertainty shock may lead to a flight to quality due
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to tighter screening and credit rationing of low quality investors by banks. Thus,
although expected productivity and project technology of investors are unchanged,
inefficient reallocation of credit due to lower collateralization decreases the growth
path of the economy in the same manner as an adverse productivity shock. Con-
versely, consider an increase in the expected productivity of investors (an aggregate
productivity shock), keeping the pledgeability of their projects unchanged. Given
the allocation of credit across investors, higher expected productivity increases ag-
gregate investment due to a rise in the project returns. However, the allocation
of credit may change in an opposing way due to lower collateralization, increasing
flight to quality and decreasing investment efficiency. In this case, the composition
effect may dominate, if reallocation of credit decreases investment efficiency in a way
that offsets the increase in investment productivity. Therefore, an increase in invest-
ment productivity may paradoxically create a bust through inefficient reallocation
of credit, if collateralization is not kept proportionally high.
In terms of policy implications, this framework provides justification for loan
guarantees or other government sponsored programs targeted towards disproportion-
ately rationed small and young businesses and innovative firms, which dispropor-
tionately account for job creation and growth. When there is a negative disturbance
in the economy that reduces collateral availability, such as a decrease in the value
of available collateral or an increase in uncertainty about pledgeable investment
returns, small business lending might be subsidized more to avoid excessive credit
rationing of these firms that would weigh on job creation and growth.
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Related Work This paper is mainly related to the literature on financial imperfec-
tions and credit regime switches. Modeling of a two sector overlapping generations
framework with a financial friction in investment production is similar to Matsuyama
(2007) and Martin (2008, 2009). Adverse selection in credit markets is modeled as
in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
Matsuyama (2007) investigates credit composition effects in a model with ho-
mogeneous agents undertaking investment projects that differ in productivity, in-
vestment requirement and pledgeability. Borrowing constraints arise due to lack of
contract enforceability. In Matsuyama (2007), credit flows only to the project with
the highest return to lenders. When borrower net worth is low, the funded project
may be the most pledgeable one rather than the most productive one, reducing
investment specific productivity. This paper differs from Matsuyama (2007)in that
borrowers differ in riskiness, which is private information, creating an adverse selec-
tion problem. This introduces contractual regime switches and a flight to quality
due to lower collateralization. Moreover, projects are decreasing returns to scale,
which endogenizes investment levels and enables credit to be allocated across many
types of investors at the same time. This paper thus brings heterogeneity in risk
and quality to the analysis of credit composition effects, complementing Matsuyama
(2007).
Martin (2008) shows how changes in borrower wealth may lead to switches
between pooling and separating regimes under adverse selection, generating endoge-
nous output fluctuations. A decrease in collateralizable borrower wealth in bad times
decreases screening possibilities and thereby increases pooling incentives, stimulat-
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ing output when the regime switches from separating to pooling. This paper differs
from Martin (2008) in the modeling of adverse selection and the collateral capacity
of investors.4 Thus, unlike in Martin (2008), lower collateralization in this paper
increases the likelihood of a separating regime rather than a pooling regime, as cross
subsidization under pooling becomes too large compared to credit rationing under
screening. In this way, lower collateralization leads to a flight to quality, which
lowers investment efficiency and economic activity.
This paper also has similarities to Azariadis and Smith (1998) and Reichlin
and Siconolfi (2004), who study credit regime switches absent borrower net worth
or collateral availability. Azariadis and Smith (1998) study a model in which op-
timism about interest rates increases loanable funds, which in turn eliminates the
rationing regime, stimulating output and increasing interest rates in a self-fulfilling
way. What eliminates the rationing regime and stimulates investment here is an
increase in the collateral capacity of investors, which induces a more efficient use of
available loanable funds, rather than an increase in loanable funds themselves. Sim-
ilarly, Reichlin and Siconolfi (2004) study a model in which a rise in loanable funds
in booms leads to a separating regime, which increases the proportion of riskier
and wasteful investment undertaken, inducing busts. However, in their model the
reversion in output is not due to inefficient allocation of credit itself, but due to the
4Martin (2008) models adverse selection as in De Meza and Webb (1987), in which expected
borrower productivity is private information. Therefore, more productive investors are not only ra-
tioned compared to the efficient allocation, but also rationed compared to less productive investors
in a separating regime, increasing the relative cost of screening.
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assumption of high setup costs associated with riskier projects.
In the remainder, the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 introduces
the agents and the basic setup. Section 1.3 characterizes the loan contracts in a
partial equilibrium setting, which is embedded in a general equilibrium framework
in section 1.4. Section 1.5 analyzes how changes in model primitives, including
collateralization, affect the likelihood of a separating regime versus a pooling regime,
and presents a numerical illustration. Section 1.6 analyzes lending regime switches,
which induce a reallocation of credit within and between groups of investors with
common observable quality, altering aggregate investment dynamics. This section
also reviews existing evidence and provides new evidence on flight to quality. Section
1.7 concludes.
1.2 Basic Setup
The economy consists of overlapping generations of two sets of measure one,
two-period lived agents: households and entrepreneurs. Households are endowed
with labor skills and their only role in this model is to provide funds for en-
trepreneurs, who undertake investment projects that produce capital. A continuum
of competitive firms produce final goods using capital produced by entrepreneurs
and labor supplied by households. Final goods are consumed or invested in capital
production. Agents save or invest final goods in the first period and consume only in
the second period. A continuum of competitive banks intermediate funds between
households (savers) and entrepreneurs (investors).
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Firms produce final goods using a constant returns to scale technology Yt =
AF (Kt, Lt), where Kt is capital, Lt is labor, and A is total factor productivity.
Let yt = Yt/Lt = AF (Kt/Lt, 1) = Ag(kt), where kt = Kt/Lt and g(kt) satisfies
g′(kt) > 0 > g
′′(kt) and Inada conditions. Factor markets are competitive, thus fac-
tor prices are qt = Ag
′(kt) for capital and wt = A[g(kt)− g′(kt)kt] for labor. Capital
is assumed to depreciate fully upon use for expositional purposes.
Households are endowed with a unit of time when young, which they use to supply
labor inelastically. They save all their income wt in banks and earn a gross return
(1+ rt+1) when old, which yields consumption (1+ rt+1)wt at t+1. Thus, aggregate
supply of funds will be St(A, kt) = wt(A, kt).
Entrepreneurs undertake an investment project when young, transforming final
goods into capital. A project may succeed or fail depending on entrepreneurial abil-
ity. Investing it units of final goods in a project yields γ̄f(it) units of capital in period
t+1 on average, where f(.) is an increasing and concave production technology, sat-
isfying f(0) = 0 and Inada conditions. γ̄ is expected investment productivity, which
is observable and common among a group of investors.5 Investors within a group
may be high or low risk in terms of success: measure λ of investors are low risk (G:
good risk) and measure 1 − λ of investors are high risk (B: bad risk). A high risk
investor has a lower success probability pB < pG, but a higher productivity γB > γG
5Note that there may be several groups of investors with different expected productivities γ̄.
The setup is constructed for a representative group of investors with a given expected productivity,
which is observable by banks.
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conditional on success. A project yields γ0 for all investors conditional on failure
regardless of investor type. Thus, expected productivity γ̄ = pjγj + (1−pj)γ0 is the
same for j ∈ {G,B}, where 0 ≤ γ0 < γ̄ < γG < γB.6
A j ∈ {G,B} type entrepreneur investing ijt in a project obtains a stochastic
rental income in period t+ 1 given by
qt+1γ
jf(ijt) with probability p
j
qt+1γ
0f(ijt) with probability (1− pj).
Since entrepreneurs have no internal funds, all investment is financed through bank
loans. Given project outcomes, entrepreneurs honor bank loans and consume the
rest of their rental income in period t+ 1.
Banks are risk neutral and competitive. They collect deposits from households
at time t at a gross return 1 + rt+1. They enter into a loan contract with a young
entrepreneur who claims to be a j ∈ {G,B} type, investing in a project with observ-
able technology f(.) and failure productivity γ0. Project success is observable and
verifiable by banks ex-post. However, ex-ante borrower risk may be private informa-
tion. A contract is a pair (ijt , R
j
t+1(γ)) specifying loan size i
j
t and state contingent
repayment Rjt+1(γ) per unit of loan, where γ ∈ {γ0, γj}. Optimal contracts are
obtained by maximizing expected borrower profits subject to bank participation,
based on observable and unobservable characteristics of loan applicants. Private
information may lead banks to design pooling or separating contracts in order to
mitigate adverse selection.







Timeline of events in a given period of the model is as follows:
1. Investment outcomes of old entrepreneurs are realized.
2. Firms hire labor from young households and rent capital from old entrepreneurs,
produce output and make factor payments.
3. Young households deposit savings in banks.
4. Old entrepreneurs honor loans given investment outcomes and consume the
rest of their rental income.
5. Old households earn returns on savings and consume those.
6. Young entrepreneurs borrow funds to undertake investment projects given
their productivity and riskiness.
1.3 Loan Contracts
In this section, time subscripts are omitted for simplicity, and loan contracts
designed for a given group of investors are characterized in a partial equilibrium
setting, to be embedded in a general equilibrium framework in the next section.
Assumption 1.1. f(ι) = ιθ for θ ∈ (0, 1) and γ0
γ̄
< θ.
The functional form of f(.) is chosen for simplicity and tractability. θ measures
the elasticity of capital production with respect to the funds invested. Thus, a 1%
increase in funds increases capital production by θ%. The precise role of Assumption
1.1 will be clear below. Given θ, Assumption 1.1 ensures γ0 is not too high, so that
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a contract can be characterized as risky debt defined by a pair (i, R), where i is the
loan amount and R is the loan rate. If projects fail, entrepreneurs default and banks
confiscate the project outcome γ0f(i), which serves as collateral.
The only source of uncertainty in the model is idiosyncratic investment pro-
ductivity, which is diversifiable. Thus, banks can guarantee a risk free return r on
household deposits. Given risk free rate r and expected rental rate qe, contract
(ij, Rj) signed with a j-type borrower yields expected profits
Πe,j = pj[qeγjf(ij)−Rjij] (1.1)
Be = pjRjij + (1− pj)qeγ0f(ij)− (1 + r)ij (1.2)
for entrepreneurs and banks, respectively. Superscript e denotes expectation as of
today for realizations tomorrow.
First consider the full information benchmark in which a borrower’s risk is
observable:
Proposition 1.1. Under full information, contracts (ij, Rj) for j ∈ {G,B} maxi-





pjRjij + (1− pj)qeγ0f(ij) = (1 + r)ij (1.4)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Equation (1.3) implies that the full information investment level, denoted as i∗,
is the same for both types. Equation (1.4) is the break even (zero profit) condition
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for the bank, which is induced by competition. Substituting (1.4) in (1.1) for Rj we
obtain
Πe,j = qeγ̄f(i∗)− (1 + r)i∗
as expected profits under full information, which is also the same for both types.





≤ 1 denote the expected recovery rate of the loan, which
is the expected rate at which repayment in the event of failure (collateral) covers
the cost of the loan for a bank. We will be refer to ce,j as collateralization and the
recovery rate interchangeably. We can rewrite (1.4) as
Rj = [1− (1− pj)ce,j]1 + r
pj
(1.5)






(1 + r). A marginal decrease in the recovery rate ce,j should be compensated
by increasing the loan rate Rj by 1−p
j
pj
(1 + r) for j ∈ {G,B}.7 As high risk projects
fail more often, the increase in the loan rate for a marginal decrease in the recovery
rate is higher for a bad type borrower. If the expected recovery rate is ce,j = 1,
then Rj = 1 + r for j ∈ {G,B}, which is the lowest loan rate chargeable, equal
to the risk free rate. If the expected recovery rate is ce,j = 0, then Rj = 1+r
pj
for
j ∈ {G,B}, which is the highest loan rate chargeable. For any given loan amount, if
the expected recovery rate is less than one, the loan rates satisfy 1 + r < RG < RB.




ij ]) pairs satisfying (1.5) constitute
equilibria given ij as in (1.3). A debt contract in which banks recover as much as they can in




ij , is a special case of these equilibrium contracts.
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Now suppose there is asymmetric information and banks are not able to dis-
tinguish high and low risk borrowers directly. As long as RG < RB at the full
information loan amount, it is always optimal for high risk borrowers to mimic be-
ing low risk. Therefore, as long as the expected recovery rate at i∗ is less than one;





< 1, which is ensured by Assumption 1.1 above, there
will be an agency problem. In this case banks either pool all loan applicants or de-
sign self selecting contracts to separate them, depending on which type of contract
is more profitable to low risk borrowers.
First consider a separating regime, in which contracts are designed to screen
out borrower types:
Proposition 1.2. Separating contracts (ij, Rj) for j ∈ {G,B} maximize (1.1) sub-
ject to nonnegative (1.2) and incentive constraints
Πe,j(il, Rl) ≤ Πe,j(ij, Rj) for j, l ∈ {G,B}. (1.6)





[qeγ̄f(iG)− (1 + r)iG]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Πe,G,s





)[1− ce,G](1 + r)iG
(1.8)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Equation (1.7) implies that, given qe and r, bad type investment is the same
as in the full information case. It is the good types who must bear the cost of sep-
aration. Good type loan amount is characterized by Equation (1.8), which derives
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from the binding incentive constraint of high risk borrowers and break even condi-
tions. Given the binding incentive constraint of bad type borrowers, the incentive








, which is satisfied for
all pG > pB as long as iG ≤ iB.
Figure 1.1: Equilibrium iG in a separating contract
Corollary 1.1. Under Assumption 1.1, iG < iB in a separating contract.





as a decreasing function
of iG, and IC depicts incentive constraint (1.8) as an inverse U-shaped function ce,G
of iG, given qe and r. RC is downward sloping because the marginal cost of iG
is constant for a bank but the marginal return in failure is decreasing in iG. IC
is inverse U-shaped because for a given expected recovery rate ce,G, in order to
make a good type contract unattractive to bad type borrowers, banks must either
restrict or expand the good type loan amount compared to the bad type efficient loan
amount. On the other hand, as the recovery rate increases, a good type contract
becomes less attractive for a bad type borrower because the bad type loan rate
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falls more than the good type loan rate for a given increase in the recovery rate.
Thus, for ce,G = 0, banks would restrict or expand the good type loan amount
heavily to achieve separation, as depicted in the figure by loan levels iG and iG.
For higher expected recovery rates, the distortion in loan amounts required for
separation becomes milder. The loan amount is undistorted and iG = iB only if the
loan is expected to be recovered fully; i.e., ce,G = 1 and Rj = 1 + r.8
Assumption 1.1 implies that the recovery rate expected from a good type
borrower at the bad type efficient loan amount, which is depicted as point P in
the figure, is less than one. In this case the two curves RC and IC intersect at two
different points. Of these two {ce,G, iG} pairs, point S, with a lower loan amount and
a higher expected recovery rate, offers higher profits to the good type and is thus
preferred by good type borrowers.9 Therefore, good type credit is rationed compared
to bad type credit under a separating regime. Note that high risk borrowers make
more profits than low risk borrowers under a separating regime.
Now consider a pooling regime, in which a common contract is designed for
all type of borrowers, without screening:
Proposition 1.3. A pooling contract (ij, Rj) = (i, R) for j ∈ {G,B} maximizes
8The intuition is similar to the arguments in Martin (2008, 2009), where loan limits and collat-
eral requirements are two different tools to achieve separation. In this setup recovery rates act as
collateral, as there are no contract enforcement or moral hazard problems.
9Along the IC curve, bad types are indifferent between any two points. Between the two points
of intersection, the one with a higher collateralization (lower loan rate) is more attractive for good
type borrowers as they succeed and repay their debt more often.
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expected profits of the borrower pool
λΠe,G,p + (1− λ)Πe,B,p = qeγ̄f(i)− p̄Ri− (1− p̄)ce(1 + r)i (1.9)
subject to the break even condition of the bank lending to the pool
p̄Ri+ (1− p̄)ce(1 + r)i = (1 + r)i (1.10)









R = [1− (1− p̄)ce]1 + r
p̄
(1.12)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Equation (1.11) implies that, given qe and r, investment in a pooling regime
attains the full information level. However, given expected recovery rate ce, the
pooling loan rate is higher than the full information loan rate for a good type bor-
rower and lower than the full information loan rate for a bad type borrower. Thus,
pooling entails cross subsidization of bad type borrowers by good type borrowers,
which can be seen from the pooling profits
Πe,G,p = [qeγ̄f(i)− (1 + r)i]− (p
G
p̄
− 1)[1− ce](1 + r)i (1.13)
Πe,B,p = [qeγ̄f(i)− (1 + r)i] + (1− p
B
p̄
)[1− ce](1 + r)i (1.14)
Equation (1.14) implies that, given qe and r, high risk borrowers always prefer a
pooling contract over a separating contract. Since both pooling and separating
contracts yield the same level of investment for high risk borrowers, they prefer a
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pooling contract as it yields a lower loan rate because of cross subsidization. Note
that high risk borrowers make more profits than low risk borrowers under the pooling
regime as well.
Lemma 1.1. The equilibrium contract will be the contract that yields higher profits
to low risk borrowers.
When a pooling contract yields higher profits than a separating contract for
both types, the equilibrium contract in this economy will be a pooling contract.
When a separating contract yields higher profits to good type borrowers and lower
profits to bad type borrowers than a pooling contract, the equilibrium contract
in this economy will be a separating contract. In the latter case, any deviation
by a bank from offering separating to pooling contracts will only attract bad type
borrowers and will yield bank losses, which rules out deviation.





contracts are offered in equilibrium.
Given qe and r, a low risk borrower compares expected profits Πe,G,s under
a separating contract, given by equation (1.8), and expected profits Πe,G,p under a
pooling contract, given by equation (1.13). A low risk borrower prefers separating
contracts whenever Πe,G,s > Πe,G,p. Lemma 1.2 states that a separating contract is
preferred by good type borrowers whenever the cost of screening given by the left
hand side is lower than the cost of cross subsidization given by the right hand side.
Pooling contracts are offered in equilibrium whenever separating contracts are not
preferred by good type borrowers.
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− 1]. Since the pooling loan amount i is higher than the separating






− 1], which is the case when λ or pB
pG
are low enough, the inequality
in Lemma 1 always holds.













G−(1+r)]iG < [1− 1−pG
1−p̄ ][R−(1+r)]i. Accordingly, given the relative
riskiness and measure of high risk borrowers, a lower risk premium payment makes
a contract more attractive to a low risk borrower.













as the relative cost of separating and
pooling contracts. For Csp > 1 the relative cost of a separating contract is high, so
that pooling is preferred by low risk borrowers. As Csp decreases, the likelihood of
a separating regime increases and when Csp < 1 separating contracts are preferred.
Lemma 1.3. Given qe and r, contractual terms satisfy





1−θ and ce = γ
0
γ̄θ
in a pooling regime,






















Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Lemma 1.3 shows that ce, iG/i and ce,G are independent of qe and r, which
implies that Csp is independent of qe and r as well. This means that general equi-
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librium prices have no effect on the equilibrium lending regime determined by Csp,
but do affect the contractual terms (ij, Rj) for j ∈ {G,B}.






and is independent of qe and r.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1.4 implies that for a group of borrowers with common observable
quality, the equilibrium lending regime, or lending standards, depends only on the
relative measure and riskiness of high and low risk borrowers within this group,
governed by λ and pB/pG, respectively; the collateral capacity of investors, governed
by γ0/γ̄ given investment technology; and the curvature of investment technology,
governed by θ. Neither changes in the risk free rate nor expected prices can affect
lending standards in this model without aggregate uncertainty.





, θ} there exists a unique λ ∈ (0, 1) such
that a low risk borrower is indifferent between a pooling and a separating contract.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.





, θ} that constitute
a lending regime switching point for a group of borrowers. Before analyzing how






and θ may alter the equilibrium lending regime for a group
of borrowers, we close the model in the next section and analyze what happens
to aggregate investment at a regime switching point, assuming there exists only
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one group of borrowers in credit markets with expected productivity γ̄ and average
riskiness p̄, which index this group’s observable quality.
1.4 General Equilibrium
In any given period, the endogenous state is the capital stock k, while the ex-





, θ}, which determine the lending regime in that period,





, θ, γ̄, A} and let ĩB(qe, r, x) and ĩG(qe, r, x)
denote the loan amounts given by the equilibrium contract.
Aggregate demand for funds is given by I = λĩG + (1 − λ)̃iB, which is equal
to aggregate supply of funds S = w = A[g(k)− gk(k)k] in equilibrium, so that
w(A, k) = I(qe, r, x). (1.15)
Capital production is given by k′ = λγ̄f (̃iG) + (1 − λ)γ̄f (̃iB), which defines the
capital accumulation frontier as
k′ = k′(qe, r, x). (1.16)
As there is no aggregate uncertainty, the expected price of capital will be equal to
the actual price of capital q′ = Agk(k
′) next period, so that
qe = q′(A, k′). (1.17)
Equations (1.15)-(1.17) characterize the solutions to k′(k, x), qe(k, x) and r(k, x),
which pin down all other variables in the economy.10
10See Appendix A.2 for a full set of equilibrium equations.
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, θ} constitute a regime switching point and let
superscripts j ∈ {p, s} denote pooling and separating lending regimes respectively.
Proposition 1.6. Given savings S(w(A, k)), at a regime switching point
i) individual investment amounts satisfy iG < i = i∗ < iB,
ii) the resulting capital stock satisfies k′s < k′p,
iii) the risk free rate satisfies rs < rp,
iv) future capital prices satisfy qe,p < qe,s.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1.6 states that savings in a given period will determine the ag-
gregate resources devoted to capital production regardless of the lending regime.
However, in a pooling regime borrowers obtain the full information loan amounts
and invest efficiently, whereas in a separating regime high risk borrowers over-invest
and low risk borrowers under-invest relative to the pooling regime. Thus, a pooling
regime yields higher capital production (physical investment) for a given amount of
resources devoted to investment due to concavity of the capital production function
f(.). This implies that a pooling regime results in higher risk free returns, higher
future output and lending, and lower future capital prices than a separating regime.
Empirical evidence by Lown and Morgan (2006) suggests that changes in bank
lending standards for allocating business loans have significant effects on economic
activity. They show that tightening credit standards, i.e., greater use of non-price
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loan terms such as higher collateral requirements and credit limits, are usually fol-
lowed by slower loan growth and often precede recessions in the US. We may inter-
pret the switches between pooling and separating regimes in the model as switches
between lax and tight lending standards induced by bank competition. A pooling
regime is a lax lending regime as it eliminates credit rationing and stimulates ag-
gregate investment, which entails higher output and lending. A separating regime
is a tight lending regime, which promotes efficient risk pricing at the expense of
credit rationing, which in turn dampens aggregate investment, future output and
lending. Note that in a separating regime collateralization will be higher on average
to facilitate efficient risk pricing.
Figure 1.2: Aggregate investment at a regime switching point
Figure 1.2 depicts the capital accumulation frontier under the two regimes at
a regime switching point. If the lending regime switches from pooling to separating,
aggregate investment falls as a result of an inefficient reallocation of credit from
low risk borrowers to high risk borrowers. In this case the economy’s growth path
shifts down as would be the case under a negative productivity shock. The degree of
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investment inefficiency in a separating regime is proportional to the degree of credit











, θ} affect the equilibrium
lending regime for a group of borrowers, by changing bank incentives to design
pooling or separating contracts.
1.5 Determinants of Lending Regime
We have seen that the likelihood of a separating regime is inversely propor-



















, θ}. In what follows, we





, θ} affect the relative cost Csp of a
separating contract, and thereby affect the relative likelihood of a separating regime.
Proposition 1.7. The effects of λ and p
B
pG










> 0 → ∂Csp
∂λ
> 0
An increase in the measure of low risk borrowers λ decreases the degree of
















> 0 → ∂Csp
∂pB/pG
> 0




the relative risk premium under a pooling contract and increases the relative




relative cost of cross subsidization, and thereby increases the likelihood of a
pooling regime.
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Proof. See Appendix A.1.
λ does not affect the quantity and the recovery rate of a loan under the two
regimes, but as λ increases, cross subsidization becomes smaller since a larger frac-
tion of low risk borrowers subsidize a smaller fraction of high risk borrowers. Thus,
the relative cost of pooling falls and pooling becomes more likely. Note that as λ
approaches 1, p̄ approaches pG and the cost of pooling vanishes.
Figure 1.3: The effect of an increase in pB/pG
Figure 1.3 depicts the effect of an increase in p
B
pG
on the RC and IC curves,
plotted against iG/iB. An increase in p
B
pG
makes the IC curve tighter, increasing iG/iB
for any rate of collateralization. The reason is that, as borrower risks become closer,
the separating loan rates become closer as well and good type contracts become
relatively less attractive for bad type borrowers. Thus, the degree of rationing needed




increases the loan rate for good types relative to bad types in a




. Therefore, recovery rate ce,G falls while ce does not change, increasing
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the relative loan rate for good types in a separating contract. Meanwhile, as high
and low risk borrowers become more similar, the degree of cross subsidization in




contract more attractive for low risk borrowers, because the desired loan amounts
become affordable under a pooling contract.
Remark 1.2 stated that a separating contract is more attractive to a low risk








1−pG − 1]. Given the
relative riskiness and measure of high and low risk borrowers, what makes a separat-
ing contract attractive to a low risk borrower despite credit rationing is the lower risk
premium associated with it. A separating contract may result in higher profits than
a pooling contract due to lower costs, although the former entails a lower amount of
investment. Therefore, an increase in the relative interest payment under a pooling
contract increases the likelihood of a separating regime, and the equilibrium lending
regime becomes separating if the relative interest payment under a pooling regime




higher investment elasticity θ (lower curvature in investment technology) increase




likelihood of a separating regime despite higher credit rationing.
A decrease in collateralization: Consider a decrease in γ0 given γ̄. As depicted in
Figure 1.4, a decrease in γ0 shifts the RC curve down for a given γ̄, decreasing
both ce,G and ce. This price effect increases the loan rates in both separating and
pooling contracts. For a given decrease in collateralization, banks need to increase
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Figure 1.4: The effect of a decrease in γ0/γ̄
loan rates more for higher risk borrowers to break even, because they fail and lose
collateral more often. Thus, the pooling loan rate increases more than the low risk
loan rate in a separating regime, increasing the degree of cross subsidization under
a pooling regime. Meanwhile, as γ0 decreases, iG decreases while i stays constant.
The reason is that, as ce,G gets lower, the high risk loan rate increases more than
the low risk loan rate in a separating regime, incentivizing high risk borrowers more
to lie about their type. Therefore, the need for credit rationing to disincentivize
high risk borrowers rises. Thus, a decrease in γ0 not only raises the loan rate, but
tightens the loan limit in a separating contract. As a result [1− ce]iB increases and
the cost of pooling rises, but the effect on [1− ce,G]iG is not transparent.
Proposition 1.8. For a low risk borrower, the cost of pooling and separating con-
tracts both decrease in pB/pG and γ0/γ̄, and increase in θ.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1.8 states that the cost of separating for good types also rises as a
29
result of a decrease in γ0 given γ̄. Thus, the likelihood of a separating regime may
increase or decrease as a result of a decrease in γ0, depending on whether the cost
of pooling or the cost of separating rises more. For relatively high θ, the cost of
separating increases less than the cost of pooling with a decrease in γ0, increasing
the likelihood of a separating regime. For relatively low θ, the cost of separating in-
creases more than the cost of pooling with a decrease in γ0, increasing the likelihood
of a pooling regime. The reason is that, when θ is high, the curvature of the invest-
ment production function decreases, making the marginal product less sensitive to
changes in the quantity invested. Thus, when θ is high, a lower loan amount in a
separating regime does not increase the marginal return on investment as much as a
higher loan rate in a pooling regime increases the marginal cost of investment. Cross
subsidization becomes so high in a pooling regime that low risk borrowers choose
to signal their type by accepting a lower loan amount at a cheaper rate, decreas-
ing their interest repayment. This is in line with the findings in Melnik and Plaut
(1986), who analyze the structure of loan commitment contracts and document that
“borrowers may trade off more favorable values of some loan variable for less favor-
able values of some other loan variable”. In particular, borrowers may “purchase”
themselves lower interest rates in exchange for lower credit commitments as is the
case when collateral capacity of investors falls in our model with a sufficiently high
θ. By decreasing the loan size, banks increase the rate of collateralization on the
loan, which facilitates a lower loan rate as desired by low risk borrowers.
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Figure 1.5: The effect of an increase in θ
A decrease in the curvature of investment technology: Figure 1.5 depicts the effect
of an increase in θ. An increase in θ shifts the RC curve down, and it also flattens
the IC curve. As a result the degree of rationing increases, since as the curvature of
production technology falls, the disincentivizing effect of iG relative to iB becomes
smaller. When θ is high, the IC curve becomes flatter and less sensitive to changes
in iG/iB at any rate of recovery. Thus, shocks in RC must be absorbed more by a
change in iG/iB and less by a change in ce,G.
An increase in θ has a similar effect on the terms of pooling and separating
contracts to a decrease in γ0/γ̄. An increase in θ decreases collateralization ce in
pooling and ce,G in separating regimes, increasing the loan rates in both regimes,
but increasing the pooling loan rate relatively more than the separating loan rate
for low risk borrowers. Thus, both the degree of cross subsidization under pooling
and the degree of credit rationing under separation rise with a higher θ. As a result,
the likelihood of a separating regime may increase or decrease with an increase in
θ, depending on whether the cost of pooling or the cost of separating rises more.
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As before, for relatively high initial θ, the cost of separating increases less than the
cost of pooling with a further increase in θ, increasing the likelihood of a separat-
ing regime. Below we numerically illustrate how changes in γ0/γ̄ and θ affect the
likelihood of a separating regime for different initial values.
1.5.1 Numerical Illustration
This section presents a numerical illustration that shows how the relative
magnitude of the costs associated with the two regimes for a low risk borrower
changes with the investment elasticity θ ∈ (0, 1) and the degree of collateralization
γ0
γ̄θ
∈ (0, 1), given pB
pG
and λ.11 We choose values for p
B
pG
and λ using data collected
by the Federal Reserve Bank’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending.12
Table 1.1 presents the time series averages of the following loan terms aggre-
gated over all C&I loans made by sample commercial banks during the survey weeks:




e reflects the degree of collateralization under a pooling regime (or under full
information), while for a low risk borrower the degree of collateralization in a separating regime is
ce,G = ce(iG/i)θ−1 > ce.
12This survey collects data (FR 2028A) on commercial and industrial (C&I) loans made by 348
commercial banks and 50 U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks to domestic customers during
the first full business week of the mid-month of each quarter. Respondents provide information on
price and non-price terms of individual loans made during the survey week, such as the interest
rate, loan size, maturity, collateralization, and loan risk ratings. From the sample data, aggregate
estimates of the terms of business loans extended during the survey week are constructed. The
estimates provide measures of the cost of business credit and lending terms. The public release of
the data covers the period 1997/2-2012/2.
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loan rate collateralization average loans total loans success rate measure
risk group (percent) (percent) ($ thousands) ($ millions) (percent) (thousands)
all C&I 4.83 39.35 592.38 88,008.41 97.15 148.57
minimal 3.91 30.73 1,284.85 5,886.57 98.75 4.58
low 4.22 25.79 1,083.52 16,656.10 98.42 15.37
moderate 4.90 42.39 551.21 30,729.49 96.89 55.75
acceptable 5.48 49.68 472.36 20,180.64 95.43 42.72
Source: The Federal Reserve Bank’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending, 1997/2-2012/2.
Table 1.1: Terms of Business Lending
3) average loan size, 4) total value of loans. The table reports values both for all
C&I loans and for subsets representing risk categories ranging from minimal risk to
acceptable risk. The fifth column reports implied repayment (success) probabilities,
calculated using equation (1.5), R = [1− (1− p)c]1+r
p
, where R equals the average
loan rate reported, c equals the average collateral rate reported, and risk free rate
r is taken as 3 percent.13 The relative measures of risk groups are not reported in
the data. Thus, as a proxy, the last column reports the implied measures of each
group, calculated as the time series averages of total value of loans divided by the
average loan size.
Accordingly, the borrower pool in the data (all C&I loans) has a success prob-
ability of around 97 percent. Note that loan terms and the success probability of the
moderate risk group roughly reflect those of the overall borrower pool. Thus, the
minimal and low risk groups are treated as low risk borrowers, while the acceptable
13The average 3-Month Treasury Bill rate (quarterly, secondary market rate) in the U.S. for the
sample period is around 2.7 percent. Source: FRED (TB3MS).
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risk group is treated as high risk borrowers when parameterizing the model.14 Low
risk borrowers have a success probability of roughly 99 percent and high risk borrow-
ers have a success probability of roughly 95 percent. Thus, p
B
pG
is set to 95/99 ≈ 96
percent. To match the success probability of the overall borrower pool, which is
around 97 percent, we set the measure of low risk borrowers λ to roughly 0.5.15
Figure 1.6 plots how the costs of pooling and separating contracts for low
risk borrowers change with the investment elasticity θ ∈ (0, 1) and collateralization
γ0
γ̄θ
∈ (0, 1) given pB
pG
and λ. The vertical axes on the left specify the cost of a pooling
or separating contract for a low risk borrower in terms of percentage losses from the
full information profits. The costs of separating and pooling contracts are computed
14One problem is that the table reports observable characteristics of the loan applicants in the
data, which are used to parameterize unobservable characteristics of the loan applicants in the
numerical example. Unobservables cannot be measured. Thus, observables are taken as a proxy




or λ do not affect the qualitative outcomes illustrated in the figures below, but
may shift the levels on the Y axes. In the last column of Table 1.1, the measure of low risk
borrowers is roughly half the measure of high risk borrowers. Note that the total measure of high
and low risk borrowers roughly matches that of the moderate risk group, which is treated as the
borrower pool in the numerical example. If we set the measure of low risk borrowers λ to roughly
1/3 instead of 1/2, pooling incentives would be lower. In the last column of Table 1.1, the measure
of all C&I loans is significantly greater than the total measure of the four risk groups, because
many of the loans (20 percent) are not rated by the respondents. Thus, we choose to set the





= 0.950.99 ≈ 0.96 and λ = 0.5.





][1− ce,G](1 + r)iG















− 1][1− ce](1 + r)i







− 1][1− ce] (1.19)
respectively, and plotted against investment elasticity θ for different rates of collat-
eralization. The legends on the right specify the alternative rates of collateralization
between zero and one, and the curves represent rising rates of collateralization from
top to bottom.
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Figure 1.6 confirms that both the cost of pooling and separating contracts
increase in θ and decrease in γ
0
γ̄θ
for a low risk borrower, as stated in Proposition 1.8.
Thus, informational frictions cause greater profit losses for low risk borrowers with
higher investment elasticity θ and lower collateralization γ
0
γ̄θ
. The reason is that when
the investment elasticity θ is high, the loss in investment, due to either a higher loan
rate from cross subsidization, or the credit rationing resulting from separation, is
higher. Collateralization helps eliminate these losses, decreasing the loan rates under
both regimes and decreasing the degree of rationing under a separating regime. For a
collateralization rate of around 40 percent, which is the average rate for the borrower
pool documented in Table 1.1, the agency costs could amount to a 10 percent loss in
profits for a low risk borrower in this setup, if the investment elasticity is relatively
high (θ close to 0.9).
Figure 1.7 plots how the relative likelihood of a separating regime Csp changes
with θ and γ
0
γ̄θ





and λ. In the top panel, in line with Figure 1.4, we see that
the relative loan size i
G
i
for low risk borrowers increases with collateralization for
any level of investment elasticity θ. On the other hand, in line with Figure 1.5, i
G
i
decreases with θ for any collateralization level. For a collateralization rate of around
40 percent, the degree of rationing could exceed 30 percent for a low risk borrower
in this example, if investment elasticity is relatively high (θ close to 0.9).
The second panel depicts the impact of θ and collateralization on [1−ce,G]/[1−
ce], which governs the loan rate for low risk types under separation relative to





= 0.950.99 ≈ 0.96 and λ = 0.5.
Figure 1.7: The likelihood of a separating regime
decreases with collateralization for any level of θ. Collateralization decreases the
loan rate for low risk borrowers in both regimes but this decrease is larger in a
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separating regime in percentage terms.16 On the other hand, [1 − ce,G]/[1 − ce]
increases with θ at any level of collateralization. Therefore, a higher investment
elasticity θ implies a higher loan rate for low risk borrowers in both regimes but this
increase is more pronounced under separation in percentage terms.
In sum, relative price and quantity effects move in opposite directions with
changes in collateralization and investment elasticity θ. The relative price of a loan
under a separating contract decreases in collateralization but increases in θ, while
the relative loan size iG/i increases in collateralization but decreases in θ. The total
effect on the likelihood of a separating regime depends on whether the relative price
or quantity effect dominates. The third panel in Figure 1.7 depicts the overall effect
of changes in collateralization and θ on the likelihood of a separating regime, given
by the inverse of the relative cost of a separating contract 1/Csp = Cp/Cs. Csp = 1
indicates the regime switching threshold and a lower Csp indicates a rising likelihood
for a separating regime. The graph confirms that for relatively low θ, an increase
in collateralization increases the likelihood of separation as the relative price effect
dominates, while for relatively high θ an increase in collateralization decreases the
likelihood of separating as the relative quantity effect dominates. As we discussed
above, the reason is that when investment elasticity θ is low, the curvature of the
investment production function is high. Therefore, a higher collateralization affects
16In absolute terms, a marginal increase in collateralization decreases the pooling loan rate more
than the separating loan rate for a low risk borrower, because the borrower pool fails more often
than a low risk borrower. However, in percentage terms, since separating loan rate is already low,
the decrease in the separating loan rate could exceed the decrease in the pooling loan rate.
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the loan quantity less than the loan price as the former is more costly in terms of
lost profits. On the other hand, the effect of an increase in θ on the likelihood of a
separating regime depends on the initial level of θ. For θ close to one, an increase
in θ increases the likelihood of a separating regime (the relative quantity effect
dominates) at any level of collateralization. Otherwise, the effect of an increase in
θ on the likelihood of a separating regime is ambiguous.
The curvature of investment technology θ, which is referred to as investment
elasticity, is central to how collateralization affects screening incentives. The capital
production function uses the final good as an input, which is a variable input such
as raw (intermediate) materials. In this case θ could be associated with the variable
input’s share in production, provided that there is a second fixed factor in place
that consumes the rest of the profits, although not specifically modeled. The fixed
factor could be land or structures owned by entrepreneurs, who possess the fixed
factor’s share in profits, which is 1− θ.
Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) document that capital’s share in investment
good producing sectors is around 1/4, which is lower than the conventional 1/3
share of capital in final good producing sectors. Therefore, the intermediate input
share in capital production, θ, would be around 3/4 in this case. On the other hand,
in the standard RBC model final goods are transformed into capital one for one,
although there might be quadratic adjustment costs.17 As a result, in the remainder
17In this model, without any further assumptions, θ = 1 would imply complete rationing of low
risk borrowers from the market because banks would only offer the high risk borrower specific
loan contract in equilibrium, which yields negative profits for low risk borrowers. In this case the
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we will focus on the case in which curvature of investment technology is limited .
Thereby, we postulate that θ is sufficiently high that lower collateralization increases
screening incentives and that a marginal increase in θ increases screening incentives
at any level of collateralization.
1.6 Credit Regime Switches
In this section we analyze how exogenous changes in collateral capacity af-
fect the allocation of credit across groups of investors with different observable and
unobservable risk levels, which in turn alters aggregate investment and shifts the
growth path of the economy. We focus on the case in which the curvature of in-
vestment technology is limited, so that lower collateralization increases separating
incentives.18
Consider groups of loan applicants with the same investment elasticity (tech-
nology) θ, who differ in expected productivity and average risk levels, which are
publicly observable. Loan applicants with the same expected productivity γ̄ and
average risk level p̄ represent firms with similar quality. Within each quality group
there are two types of borrowers, high and low risk, that cannot be observation-
ally distinguished as before. Below we analyze how a fall in the collateral capacity
of investors may lead to an inefficient reallocation of credit, both across borrowers
with different unobservable risk levels within the same quality group, and between
economy would attain investment efficiency and there would be no regime switching.




1.6.1 Reallocation of Credit within a Quality Group
Suppose there are only two firms operating in the economy with a given capital
production technology θ. They have the same expected productivity γ̄ and collater-
alization given by ce = γ
0
γ̄θ
, but they differ in risk levels, which is private information.
As discussed above, a fall in collateralization increases separating incentives if in-
vestment technology is not too concave, i.e., if θ is not too low. On the other hand,
regardless of the value of θ, a decrease in collateralization increases the degree of
rationing (i.e., decreases iG/i) for a low risk borrower under a separating regime. Be-
low we illustrate the effects of a fall in collateralization given investment technology,
such as a fall in γ0 given γ̄, which corresponds to a financial shock increasing the
uncertainty in investment returns while keeping the expected returns unchanged,
or a rise in γ̄ given γ0. We show that a decline in collateralization may reduce
aggregate investment through inefficient reallocation of credit across investors.
Figure 1.8 illustrates the possible effects of a decrease in γ0 given γ̄ on aggregate
investment, under the presumption that θ is relatively high. That is, suppose at time
T there is a fall in the pledgeable returns of projects, while overall productivity of
investors is not changed. The graphs depict the growth path of the economy before
and after time T under two scenarios, in which the initial regime is pooling (P) or
separating (S).
Panel (a) shows that, if the lending regime is initially pooling, a decrease in
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(a) Initially Pooling (b) Initially Separating
Figure 1.8: An increase in γ0 given γ̄, for relatively high θ
γ0 would increase the likelihood of a separating regime, in which case banks may
continue pooling investors at a higher degree of cross subsidization, or may switch to
separating investors, reallocating credit from low risk to high risk investors within
a given quality group. In the former case, a decrease in γ0 would not affect the






obtained by high and low risk borrowers would not change. The decrease in γ0
would only increase the pooling loan rate R = [1− (1− p̄)ce]1+r
p̄
, which redistributes
profits from low risk borrowers to high risk borrowers as given by equations (1.13)-
(1.14), increasing the inequality in profit distribution. In the latter case, a switch
to the separating regime would reallocate both profits and credit from low risk to
high risk investors, decreasing aggregate investment efficiency by moving the growth
path from P to S ′ in the economy.
Panel (b) shows that, if the lending regime is initially separating, a decrease
in γ0 would affect the composition of credit by increasing the degree of rationing
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iB/iG under separating contracts. In this case, the growth path of the economy
moves from S to S ′, increasing the inefficiency in aggregate investment by moving
the economy further away from the efficient growth path P . Thus, given savings
S = w(A, k) in the economy, a decrease in γ0 may reallocate credit from low risk
borrowers to high risk borrowers of a given quality. As a result aggregate investment
falls, in which case the growth path of the economy shifts down, decreasing future
capital, output and lending in the economy. In this way, although the average
efficiency of the productive technology is unchanged in the economy, i.e., γ̄ and
θ are constant, inefficient reallocation of credit due to lower collateralization may
decrease investment specific productivity in the same way as an adverse productivity
shock.
Now consider an increase in the overall productivity of investors γ̄ at time T ,
keeping γ0 unchanged. In this case there will be two opposing effects on aggregate
investment. Keeping the composition of credit constant, an increase in γ̄ increases
aggregate investment as investors become more productive. However, an increase
in γ̄ also decreases collateralization γ
0
γ̄θ
, which may change the composition of credit
in an opposing way, under the presumption that θ is relatively high. Figure 1.9
illustrates the possible effects of an increase in γ̄ given γ0 on aggregate investment
when θ is relatively high. In this case, a decrease in collateralization increases
screening incentives and may change the composition of credit by reallocating credit
from low risk borrowers to high risk borrowers with a given quality.
Panel (a) shows that, if the lending regime is initially pooling, an increase in
γ̄ could either keep the composition of credit unchanged and redistribute profits
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(a) Initially Pooling (b) Initially Separating
Figure 1.9: An increase in γ̄ given γ0, for relatively high θ
from low risk borrowers to high risk borrowers, or switch the lending regime into
separating and reallocate credit from low risk borrowers to high risk borrowers.
In the former case, although lower collateralization decreases pooling incentives,
the economy does not switch lending regimes. The growth path shifts from P
to P ′, where investment is efficient at a higher productivity level, although the
inequality between high and low risk borrower profits grows. In the latter case,
lower collateralization switches the lending regime into separating, in which case the
growth path may shift up or down depending on whether the opposing composition
or productivity effects dominate. The growth path may shift down from P to SL
when the composition effect dominates, in which case reallocation of credit from low
risk borrowers to high risk borrowers decreases investment efficiency in a way that
offsets the increase in investment productivity. The growth path may shift up from
P to SH when the productivity effect dominates, in which case aggregate investment
increases but not as far as the efficient level because of the composition effect.
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Panel (b) shows that, if the lending regime is initially separating, an increase
in γ̄ would increase the degree of rationing iB/iG under separating contracts, real-
locating credit further away from low risk borrowers to high risk borrowers. Once
again the total effect on aggregate investment depends on the opposing composi-
tion and productivity effects. The growth path may shift down from S to SL when
the composition effect dominates, or up from S to SH when the productivity ef-
fect dominates as discussed above. Thus, good prospects on aggregate investment
productivity may paradoxically create a bust due to inefficient reallocation of credit
across borrowers if collateralization is not kept proportionally high.
Discussion: An important point to note here is that with only one group of bor-
rowers with the same average productivity, a deterioration of collateral capacity of
borrowers causes credit to flow from unobservably low risk borrowers to unobservably
high risk borrowers. In the next section, we show how allowing for multiple groups
of borrowers with different observable average productivity and average risk levels
(quality) makes the model consistent with the stylized fact that credit flows in favor
of higher-quality borrowers in bad times due to a flight to quality, a phenomenon
documented by Lang and Nakamura (1995) and Bernanke et al. (1996) among many
others. Accordingly, credit flows away from borrowers subject to higher agency costs,
and flows in favor of higher quality borrowers during periods of recession or when
borrower balance sheets deteriorate.
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1.6.2 Reallocation of Credit between Quality Groups
In this section we allow for multiple groups of borrowers that differ in expected
productivity and average risk levels (quality) to show how a financial shock that
reduces the collateral capacity of investors may lead to a recession through inefficient
reallocation of credit towards high quality investors (a flight to quality) due to
tighter screening and separating across low quality investors by banks (tightening
standards). First we review some empirical evidence on a flight to quality in bank
lending, and then we show how a fall in the collateral capacity of investors can
generate a flight to quality in the model.
Flight to Quality in Bank Lending: Empirical Evidence Using data from the Fed-
eral Reserve Board’s Survey on Terms of Business Lending between the period 1977
to 1993, Lang and Nakamura (1995) and Asea and Blomberg (1998) analyze in-
dividual loan terms on new commercial and industrial loans made by a sample of
commercial banks, including loan size, loan rate and bank risk rating of loans, to
look for evidence for a flight to quality in bank lending. They categorize high qual-
ity loans as relatively safe loans, that are made at or below the prime rate plus 1
percent in each bank. Asea and Blomberg (1998) document that the proportion of
safe loans made by banks increases in periods with a high variance across loan rates
charged by banks, suggesting that a flight to quality occurs in periods with a tighter
bank screening and separating across loan applicants. Moreover, both Asea and
Blomberg (1998) and Lang and Nakamura (1995) document that increases in the
proportion of safe bank loans are associated with future reductions in real economic
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activity.
Figure 1.10: Flight to quality: Proportion of safe bank loans 1979-1992
Source: Figure 1 in Lang and Nakamura (1995).
Figure 1.10 is borrowed from Lang and Nakamura (1995), showing the evo-
lution of the proportion of safe bank loans over time. Shaded areas depict U.S.
recessions. Evidently, a flight to quality in bank lending precedes all three reces-
sions between 1979-1992. A bivariate vector auto-regression conducted by Lang and
Nakamura confirms that increases in the proportion of safe loans (flights to quality)
are highly predictive of future reductions in real GDP.
Here we conduct a similar exercise to Lang and Nakamura (1995) for more
recent periods. The survey data for individual bank loans are not publicly available.
However, as stated in section 1.5.1, the Federal Reserve reports aggregate estimates
of the terms of business lending for all C&I loans and for four subsets representing
risk categories reported by banks, namely minimal risk, low risk, moderate risk and
acceptable (high) risk loans. We categorize low quality loans as relatively high risk
loans, labeled as moderate and high risk groups by banks. As seen in Table 1.1
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Figure 1.11: Proportion of risky bank loans 1997-2012
Source: FRB Survey of Terms of Business Lending, 1997/2-2012/2.
in section 1.5.1,these two groups are charged average loan rates above the average
rate for all C&I loans. Figure 1.11 plots the evolution of the proportion of risky
(low quality) bank loans over time. We see that the proportion of risky bank loans
decreases prior to both the 2001 and 2008 recessions. Moreover, Granger causality
tests confirm that decreases in the proportion of risky bank loans are highly pre-
dictive of future reductions in real GDP.19 Although test results do not suggest a
direct causality, they suggest that reallocation of credit across groups of borrowers
is associated with fluctuations in real economic activity.
Flight to Quality in Bank Lending: Theoretical Framework In this section we al-
low for multiple groups of borrowers that differ in expected productivity and average
risk levels (quality), which are publicly observable. Within each group there are two
types of borrowers, high and low risk, that cannot be observationally distinguished
19See Appendix A.4 for test results.
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as before. Therefore, whenever credit flows from (unobservably) low risk borrowers
to high risk borrowers within the same quality group due to a decrease in the collat-
eral capacity of investors, increased inefficiency affects the relative creditworthiness
among different quality groups, making credit flow to observably higher quality
groups, with lower average risk levels. Thus, credit flows away from borrowers more
subject to agency costs, i.e., low quality borrowers who are more likely to be screened
in this context, consistent with a flight to quality.
Suppose there are two groups of loan applicants, type-1 and type-2, operating
in the economy. These types have a common investment production function pa-
rameter θ, but possibly different expected productivities satisfying γ̄1 ≥ γ̄2. Assume
that pB/pG and λ are the same in these two groups for simplicity, while p̄ is different.
Thus, lenders divide loan applicants in credit markets into groups of different ob-
servable quality, with the groups having similar risk dispersion but different average
risk levels.
As γ̄1 ≥ γ̄2, under full information type-1 borrowers would obtain a (weakly)
higher loan amount as they are more productive on average. Given general equi-











1−θ , respectively. Under asymmetric information about borrower risk, whether
these borrowers obtain the desired loan amounts depends on the equilibrium credit
regime, which in turn depends on collateralization, among other primitives. Re-
member that the investment elasticity θ is presumed to be relatively high, so that
lower collateralization increases the likelihood of separation.
First consider the case in which p̄1 > p̄2, so that type-2 borrowers are riskier
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than type-1 borrowers on average. We assume observably riskier borrowers are
subject to higher agency costs, which means that they can pledge a smaller part of
their project returns. Therefore, γ01 and γ
0






, so that high quality
borrowers (who have high productivity and low risk on average) can pledge project
returns more easily. In this case, type-2 borrowers are more likely to be screened by
lenders, and they obtain a lower loan amount. Type-2 borrowers may represent small
or family owned businesses in the economy with a lower collateral capacity, while
type-1 borrowers may represent corporate firms with a higher collateral capacity.
When type-2 borrowers are more likely to be screened than type-1 borrowers,
there are three possible lending regime scenarios: pool borrowers within each group
(pp regime), pool type-1 borrowers and separate type-2 borrowers (ps regime), or
separate borrowers within each group (ss regime). In this case there are two regime
switching points: the first is where a low risk borrower of type-2 is indifferent between
a pooling (pp) and a separating regime (ps), and the second is where a low risk
borrower of type-1 is indifferent between a pooling (ps) and a separating regime
(ss).
Suppose the economy is initially in good times, pooling borrowers within both
high quality (type-1) and low quality (type-2) groups. In this case borrowers obtain
the efficient, full information loan amounts given above. Consider a financial shock
that reduces the collateral capacity of investors, i.e., suppose γ0j for j ∈ {1, 2}
falls keeping γ̄j constant so that investors can pledge a smaller part of their project
returns. In this case lower collateralization affects the low quality group first as they
are more likely to be screened by lenders. Thus, the economy switches to separating
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low quality borrowers first, in which case low risk borrowers in the low quality group
are rationed compared to high risk ones. In this case, given general equilibrium










1−θ and iG2 (q
e, r) < iB2 (q
e, r)
in high and low quality groups, respectively.20 As quality is observable, relative
creditworthiness between type-1 and type-2 borrowers, determined by their relative
productivity levels, should be recovered in equilibrium. That is, the amount of credit
extended to high risk borrowers of type-1 relative to high risk borrowers of type-2
should reveal relative productivity of the two types in equilibrium. Thus, when
collateral capacity of investors deteriorates, credit will not only flow away from low
risk to high risk borrowers within a group of low quality borrowers, but will also flow
away in favor of higher quality borrowers, with a lower average risk level.21 This
result can be formalized as follows:






, at a regime switching point












i) the capital stock satisfies k′ss < k′ps < k′pp,
ii) the risk free rate satisfies rss < rps < rpp,
iii) future capital prices satisfy qe,pp < qe,ps < qe,ss.
20Note that in this case general equilibrium prices also change but we use the same prices qe
and r with a slight abuse of notation.
21Technically, with only two groups of borrowers there could be a flight from quality if the regime
switches from ps to ss. However, we assume that there are always prime borrowers, who are pooled
by banks and who attract more credit when regime switches occur. Thus, we assume in a model
with only two groups of borrowers that high quality borrowers are always pooled.
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Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1.9 states that, whenever the regime switches from pooling to
separating type-j borrowers, for j ∈ {1, 2}, the economy moves to a less efficient
growth path. When lenders switch from pooling to separating type-j borrowers, low
risk type-j borrowers are rationed credit compared to high risk type-j borrowers.
This inefficiency affects the relative creditworthiness across type-j and non type-j
borrowers with observable quality, reallocating credit away from type-j borrowers to
non type-j borrowers. Thus, when lenders switch from pooling to separating type-j
borrowers, credit is reallocated away from low risk type-j borrowers to all other
borrowers, decreasing the overall ratio
Ij
Ij′
of credit obtained by type-j borrowers
relative to non type-j borrowers, decreasing aggregate investment efficiency.
Now consider the alternative case for type-1 and type-2 borrowers, in which
γ̄1 ≥ γ̄2 but p̄1 < p̄2, so that borrowers who are more productive on average are
riskier on average. In this case we assume γ01 and γ
0







that highly productive but riskier borrowers are subject to higher agency costs
and they can pledge project returns less easily. Thus, there is a tradeoff between
productivity and pledgeability: high productivity firms with low collateralization are
more likely to be screened than low productivity firms with high collateralization.For
example Type-1 borrowers could represent high-tech firms with a new but advanced
technology, which are highly productive but are subject to higher agency costs due
to absence or uncertainty about the collateral value of their projects, while type-
2 borrowers could represent low-tech firms with a well established but standard
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technology, which are less productive but are subject to lower agency costs.
When type-1 borrowers are more likely to be screened than type-2 borrow-
ers, a decrease in the collateral capacity of investors affects the high productivity
(type-1) group first as they are more likely to be screened by lenders. Thus, when
the economy switches from pooling to separating type-1 borrowers, credit will flow
away from high productivity borrowers to low productivity borrowers due to higher
agency costs faced by the former. This is consistent with the stylized fact that high-
tech firms with innovative technologies are more likely to be rationed credit due
to absence or uncertainty of collateral value for their investment.22 The allocative
inefficiency in this case decreases aggregate investment even more than the previ-
ous case, because in this case highly productive high-tech firms are rationed credit,
decreasing aggregate investment productivity more intensely.
A natural policy recommendation implied by this framework is promoting gov-
ernment sponsored credit programs in times of tight credit, such as increasing Small
Business Administration guaranteed loans for disproportionately rationed small and
young businesses and innovative firms, which disproportionately account for job cre-
ation and growth. When there is a negative disturbance in the economy that reduces
collateral availability, such as a decrease in the value of available collateral or an
increase in uncertainty about pledgeable investment returns, small business lending
might be subsidized more to avoid excessive credit rationing, which otherwise would
weigh on job creation and growth.
22See Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) and Luigi Guiso (1998) among others for evidence on
the U.S. and Italian high-tech firms, respectively.
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1.7 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes how credit is reallocated within and between groups of
investors with different observable quality, i.e., different average productivity and
average risk rating, when exogenous shocks affect borrowers’ financing conditions.
The main finding is that worsening financing conditions may lead to recessions
through inefficient reallocation of credit towards high quality investors, due to tighter
screening and credit rationing of low quality investors by banks.
When collateral capacity of investors deteriorates, borrowers with lower ob-
servable quality are affected first, as they are subject to higher agency costs mea-
sured by the pledgeability of their project returns. For low quality borrowers with
observable average risk but unobservable individual risk levels, banks offer a menu
of separating contracts: one with the efficient loan amount at a higher loan rate
and another with a lower than efficient loan amount at a lower loan rate. In this
case low risk borrowers of low quality self select the contract that offers cheap credit
at the expense of a lower credit amount. This leads to a reallocation of credit to-
wards higher risk borrowers within the low quality group, which affects the relative
creditworthiness across groups of borrowers with different quality, and leads to a
reallocation of credit towards high quality borrowers. This inefficiency in the ag-
gregate allocation of credit decreases aggregate physical investment, which in turn
decreases aggregate output and lending, and further decreases aggregate investment
in the economy. Although the main objective of this paper is theoretical, the model
captures the stylized evidence that a flight to quality in bank lending occurs when
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borrower balance sheets deteriorate and banks tighten credit standards dispropor-
tionately, leading to a decrease in economic activity.
One future extension is to incorporate aggregate uncertainty to the current
framework to analyze how current and future prospects about aggregate neutral
and investment specific productivity alter the allocation of credit through the fi-
nancial contracts available to investors. In particular one could ask whether the
allocation of credit may serve as an amplifier of aggregate productivity shocks. In
principle, a productivity shock may change the allocation of credit in an amplifying
or dampening way. Consider a positive and persistent shock to total factor produc-
tivity. A high productivity today increases expectations on future productivity and
future prices, boosting the value of available collateral. Thus, anticipated returns
for banks in the event of a borrower failure increase. However, a high productivity
today also boosts lending and investment, which expands the set of states in which a
borrower will fail. Thus, expected returns for banks may fall due to increased risk of
default. As a result, the cost of lending, and thereby incentives to pool or separate
borrowers, may rise or fall depending on the distribution of aggregate productivity,
among other model primitives. Using the FRB’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Sur-
vey, Bassett et al. (2012) document that uncertainty about the economic outlook is
the number one reason banks tighten credit standards. Adding first and second mo-
ment shocks to aggregate productivity, this framework can be used to examine how
pessimism and uncertainty about future realizations of aggregate productivity affect
bank incentives for setting lending standards, which in turn affect the allocation of
credit across groups of borrowers and thereby economic activity.
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Chapter 2
Costly Screening in Credit Markets, Net Worth Effects and
Business Cycles
2.1 Introduction
Existing dynamic models with credit market frictions mostly assume ex-post
asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers.1 In particular, monitoring
costs have been widely used to motivate agency costs associated with unsecured
lending, which makes borrower net worth matter for finance and creates a channel
through which aggregate shocks are amplified and propagated. This chapter studies
a dynamic model featuring ex-ante asymmetric information in credit markets and
costly screening of loan applicants. It examines the conditions under which loan
applicants are screened in equilibrium, and how costly screening can create net worth
effects that enhance the propagation of aggregate shocks compared to a standard
dynamic model with ex-post monitoring costs.
The findings suggest that screening costs in credit markets can generate net
1Ex-post asymmetric information in credit markets refers to informational asymmetries between
lenders and borrowers after the loan is disbursed. Examples include contract enforcement, moral
hazard and bankruptcy verification problems. Informational asymmetries prevailing before the
loan is disbursed refer to ex-ante asymmetric information, which are associated with the inability
of lenders to evaluate borrower riskiness and quality accurately, such as adverse selection.
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worth effects that are at least as strong as those generated by widely assumed mon-
itoring costs both qualitatively and quantitatively. One advantage of the screening
framework is that it yields wealth effects that induce persistent dynamics, especially
in bad times when screening is more likely, which may create busts that are deeper
and longer than booms. Moreover, the screening framework yields type specific loan
terms endogenously, which makes screening costs an empirically plausible alternative
to monitoring costs to motivate agency costs in unsecured lending.
Entrepreneurs with privately observed investment projects, which may be high
or low quality in terms of profitability, apply for unsecured loans to obtain external
finance as a supplement to their net worth. Moreover, investment projects yield a
risky outcome. In principle, there are three potential types of information asymme-
try in this setup. First, entrepreneurs are better informed about the quality of their
projects ex-ante, and low quality project holders have an incentive to pretend to have
a high quality project in order to borrow at a lower rate. Second, entrepreneurs are
better informed about the outcome of their risky projects ex-post, and successful
entrepreneurs have an incentive to pretend to go bankrupt in order not to pay back
their debt. Third, entrepreneurs may deviate from investing the loan in their con-
tracted project ex-post and simply use the loan for another purpose, to finance a
riskier project, for instance, or just to consume.
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) (hereafter CF) and
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) (hereafter BGG) are the pioneering works
studying the second problem, in which borrowers tend to hide project outcomes
absent monitoring. In the literature following CF and BGG, monitoring costs have
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been widely used in models with credit market frictions, studying a wide variety of
issues regarding firm finance and real-financial interactions.2 Meanwhile, Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997) is a seminal work studying the third, moral hazard problem, in
which borrowers tend to undertake riskier projects with high private benefits absent
monitoring. In this chapter we instead study the first, adverse selection problem,
in which borrowers tend to hide project qualities absent screening, which is also
costly. Lenders choose to screen borrowers whenever screening costs are low enough,
whenever project qualities are sufficiently distinct, which increases the uncertainty
about project outcomes, and whenever borrowers with high quality projects are
relatively scarce. Thus, screening is more likely during adverse economic conditions.
Bernanke and Gertler (1990) argue that monitoring costs are tractable and
simple to implement, but empirically too small to initiate financial distress. Sim-
ilarly, Wang and Williamson (1998) state that the costs that appear to be most
important for real world financial intermediaries are not ex post verification costs
but ex ante costs of information acquisition. For lenders, these costs are primarily
associated with the screening of loan applicants. As an alternative to monitoring
costs, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) model agency costs as arising from enforcement
problems, which lead to secured lending, as borrowers cannot be forced to repay
2See among many others, Cooley and Quadrini (2001), who show that financing constraints as-
sociated with costly monitoring can explain firm growth patterns. Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno
(2010) analyze financial factors in economic fluctuations making use of a costly state verification
framework. Covas and den Haan (2010) use the costly monitoring framework to match the cyclical
behavior of debt and equity issuance.
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unless the debt is secured. Thus, aggregate shocks affect the value of collateral and
the ability to obtain external finance, which amplifies and propagates the initial
shock. However, regardless of whether loans are secured or unsecured, both Kiy-
otaki and Moore and CF/BGG type models disregard the fact that there are diverse
types of loan applicants ex-ante, who are screened and thus charged type specific
loan terms by the lenders, and in some cases are credit rationed or simply denied
a loan. This paper studies ex-ante borrower heterogeneity and costly screening in
credit markets as opposed to ex-post verification and enforcement problems, and
shows that a screening model is equally capable of creating net worth effects.
Following the modeling approach in CF, this paper embeds this particular
ex-ante asymmetric information problem in an otherwise standard RBC model, rul-
ing out ex-post monitoring, moral hazard and enforcement problems. The financial
contract is based on De Meza and Webb (1987), who study the effects of private
information about project types on aggregate investment and on the financial struc-
ture of borrowers, and on Wang and Williamson (1998), who study optimality of
debt contracts under costly screening of borrower types. Our findings suggest that
the ex ante asymmetric information problem creates net worth effects that enhance
the propagation of aggregate shocks as much as ex-post verification problems. As
lenders are especially likely to resort to costly screening during adverse economic
conditions, net worth effects that induce persistent investment and output dynam-
ics tend to occur especially in bad times, which makes economic busts deeper and
longer than booms. In addition, in our model different productivity groups are
charged different loan rates, and there is credit rationing in the sense that appli-
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cants with low quality investment projects do not obtain loans. Thus, screening
costs may constitute an empirically plausible alternative to monitoring costs to mo-
tivate agency costs in unsecured lending, enabling models to generate risk pricing
and credit rationing.3
Previous dynamic equilibrium studies with ex-ante information frictions, which
are closely related to this paper include Kurlat (2010), House (2006) and Hobijn and
Ravenna (2009). Kurlat (2010) focuses on adverse selection in financial markets and
studies a dynamic economy featuring ex-ante asymmetric information about project
quality. The main difference between this paper and Kurlat’s is that the latter
features a “lemons” problem as in Akerlof (1970), where borrowing constrained
entrepreneurs sell past projects with privately observed quality to finance new ones.
In this paper, entrepreneurs are allowed both to borrow to raise external funds and
to use the outcomes of past projects to raise internal funds. This paper especially
focuses on the effects of ex ante information acquisition problems on borrowing and
the screening outcome that arises to separate borrowers as in actual credit markets.
In Kurlat (2010), asymmetric information gives rise to an adverse selection problem
that causes bad projects to drive good ones out of the market, whereas in our model
asymmetric information causes good projects to draw in bad ones.4
House (2006) studies how ex ante asymmetric information about both riski-
3Note that relationship lending, which mitigates both ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric infor-
mation between lenders and borrowers, is an important feature of lines of credit extended to small
businesses, as shown in Berger and Udell (1995). This paper abstracts from relationship lending
to focus on the wealth effects induced by ex-ante asymmetric information per se.
4This distinction is due to De Meza and Webb (1987).
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ness and expected returns of investment projects distorts loan markets and affects
the stability of an economy. Aggregate shocks affect the distribution of a loan pool,
which in some cases destabilizes the economy, and in others makes the economy
excessively stable (the opposite of a financial accelerator). Stabilizer equilibria may
arise when financial frictions cause overinvestment in equilibrium (low types also
invest) as in De Meza and Webb (1987). In this case, an increase in net worth can
curtail overinvestment. This paper also uses the De Meza and Webb (1987) frame-
work. However, intermediaries here have access to a costly screening technology to
separate borrower types, overcoming the overinvestment problem but introducing a
new friction in terms of a resource cost. Thus, a financial accelerator arises because
of the latter friction, and separation (instead of a loan pool) allows the model to
generate type specific loan terms and credit rationing as in actual credit markets.
Hobijn and Ravenna (2009) also feature an adverse selection problem in credit
markets and costly screening. The authors incorporate an imperfect credit market
into a standard New Keynesian (NK) model of monetary policy, in which consumers
with different credit scores need to finance credit good purchases in advance. They
obtain an endogenous risk profile of interest rates and analyze how endogenous
securitization of loans amplifies the propagation mechanism in their NK model,
which adds a new channel for monetary policy to influence the economy. The main
difference of this work from theirs is that in the latter, financial frictions have no
effect on the balance sheets of the agents, meaning that there is no net worth
effect to cause propagation of aggregate shocks. Instead, propagation is achieved
by nominal rigidities in the NK model, while adverse selection leads to endogenous
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securitization of loans, which amplifies this propagation. This paper focuses more
on the mechanism by which an adverse selection problem can result in net worth
effects on aggregate fluctuations.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 presents the
model, characterizes the equilibrium and discusses the solution methodology; section
2.3 presents the model economy’s impulse responses to aggregate and investment
specific productivity shocks and discusses/compares the implications of different
agency cost models; and section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Model
The economy consists of a continuum of infinitely lived consumers, firms and
financial intermediaries. Consumers consist of η measure of entrepreneurs and 1− η
measure of non-entrepreneurs. Firms produce non-storable final goods using capital
rented and labor supplied by both types of consumers. Entrepreneurs transform
final goods into storable investment goods using a risky investment technology.
Investment technology differs among entrepreneurs because investment projects
undertaken may be high or low quality in terms of their returns. Entrepreneurs who
undertake their investment projects (labeled as investors) obtain external funds from
financial intermediaries who in turn obtain funds from non-entrepreneurs (house-
holds) and possibly other entrepreneurs who do not undertake their investment
projects (labeled as non-investors). As the quality of investment projects that en-
trepreneurs hold is private information, low quality project holders have an incentive
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to lie about the quality of their projects unless they are screened by the interme-
diaries. Thus, intermediaries may use a costly screening technology to separate
borrowers with different quality of projects and make type specific loans to borrow-
ers. If a project is successful, the borrower repays the loan; if not, the borrower goes
bankrupt and restructures in the next period.
2.2.1 Timeline
Here is a timeline of events in a given period of the model:
1. Aggregate productivity is realized.
2. Firms hire labor and rent capital from both households and entrepreneurs, make
factor payments and produce output given aggregate productivity.
3. Entrepreneurs learn the quality of their projects and become investors or nonin-
vestors given idiosyncratic and aggregate states for investment.
4. Households and noninvestors make their consumption-saving decisions over their
labor and capital income. In order to save, they purchase investment goods from
banks in exchange for final goods.
5. Investors exchange their capital for final goods with banks to raise internal funds
and they enter into a loan contract with banks to raise external funds.
6. Investors undertake their investment projects. If they are successful, they repay the
loans; if not, they go bankrupt.
7. Investors who are still solvent make their consumption-saving decisions.
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Thus, capital purchased by consumers from the banks comes from three dis-
tinct sources. First, before investment takes place, investors exchange their accu-
mulated capital for final goods with banks to raise internal funds. Second, after
investment takes place, successful entrepreneurs repay the loans of final goods taken
out from banks in terms of newly created capital. Third, entrepreneurs who are still
solvent make their consumption-saving decisions, exchanging a portion of their new
capital for consumption goods with banks and saving the rest.
2.2.2 Households’ Problem
Households are identical and decide how much to work, consume and save in
each period t. They enter period t with 1 unit of time endowment and kt units of
accumulated capital. They supply labor lt to firms for wage wt and rent capital to
firms for rental rate rt. They consume ct of their labor and capital income. Since
the consumption good is nonstorable, in order to save for the future they purchase
claims to investment goods from the banks at price qt.
5 Thus, households choose ct,




βtu(ct, 1− lt) (2.1)
subject to the period t budget constraint
ct + qtkt+1 = [rt + qt(1− δ)]kt + wtlt. (2.2)
5Put differently, households transform their unconsumed income into investment goods at a
transformation rate of 1/qt. This rate is the risk free rate on household deposits in terms of
investment goods.
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β denotes the subjective discount factor of the representative household and δ de-
notes the rate of depreciation of capital.6 Thus, the solution to the household’s
problem yields labor supply and savings supply (investment good demand) choices




qtuc(t) = βEtuc(t+ 1)[rt+1 + qt+1(1− δ)] (2.4)
respectively.
2.2.3 Firms’ Problem
Firms are identical and decide how much labor to hire and capital to rent from
households and entrepreneurs in each period t in order to produce output Yt of the
final good, which is consumed or transformed into capital. They maximize profits
Πt = Yt − rtKt − wtHt − wetHet (2.5)
where Kt is the aggregate capital stock of all agents, Ht is aggregate household
labor and Het is aggregate entrepreneurial labor. Output at time t is given by
Yt = ztF (Kt, Ht, H
e
t ), where F is a constant returns to scale (CRS) production
technology and zt is aggregate productivity.
The solution to the firms’ problem yields the first order conditions
rt = ztF1(t), wt = ztF2(t), w
e
t = ztF3(t) (2.6)
6Households also own an equal equity share in each of the firms and the banks, profits of which
are zero in equilibrium.
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which characterize aggregate factor demands, payments of which exhaust the aggre-
gate output completely.
2.2.4 Entrepreneurs’ Problem
Entrepreneurs enter period t with 1 unit of time endowment and ket units of
accumulated capital; and they choose how much to invest, consume and save during
period t. At the beginning of each period, entrepreneurs supply labor inelastically to
firms for wage wet and rent capital to firms for rental rate rt. Then they privately face
an investment project with a random quality, which consists of a risky technology
for transforming final goods into investment goods. They invest it units of final
goods in their projects, and after project outcomes are revealed they consume cet












where, yet denotes ex-post entrepreneurial income in period t, the form of which will
be specified below. Note that entrepreneurs are risk neutral and they discount the
future at rate βe.
Investment projects yield a risky return xt ∈ {0, x̄t} of capital goods for each
unit of final goods invested, where 0 < x̄t. However, investment projects differ
in quality, which can be either high or low. Entrepreneurs can face a high quality
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project (type H) with probability α or a low quality project (type L) with probability
1− α. A high quality project has a higher success probability pH > pL of obtaining
a nonzero return. Thus, investing it units of final goods in a type j ∈ {H,L} project
yields an expected return of pjx̄tit capital goods in period t, which is higher for a
high quality project.
Entrepreneurs may finance investment projects both internally and externally.
In order to raise internal funds, entrepreneurs may use their labor and capital in-
come, together with their undepreciated capital exchanged for final goods with the





t [rt + qt(1− δ)] (2.9)
in terms of final goods.
Given their observed project type j ∈ {H,L}, in order to raise external funds
entrepreneurs may borrow bjt ≥ 0 from the banks with gross interest rate R
j
t (xt)
depending on the project outcome (and possibly other borrower characteristics) so
that they can invest up to ijt ≤ nt + b
j
t final goods in their projects.
7,8 Given Rjt (xt)
7Since the type of a borrower with project quality j ∈ {H,L} is private information, en-
trepreneurs may have an incentive to lie about their types and try to borrow on more favorable
terms, lowering banks’ expected profits. Thus, we are anticipating here that banks may design
contracts in which type j ∈ {H,L} project holders pay Rjt (xt) on their loans b
j
t . Note that
Rjt (xt) = Rt(xt) and b
j
t = bt ∀j ∈ {H,L} is also an outcome, which pools the types.
8No moral hazard assumption implies ijt ≥ b
j
t . Thus, borrowers use the loans only for investment
purposes, i.e. they do not consume the loan.
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and the loan amount bjt , they choose i
j













which should exceed the opportunity cost (ijt−b
j
t) of investing out of their net worth.





liability assumption, which implies Rjt (0)b
j
t = 0 ∀j ∈ {H,L}. Thus, when project is
unsuccessful, banks cannot extract resources from the borrower, and the last term
in brackets in the profit function is redundant.
Thus, ex-post income yet of an entrepreneur with net worth nt, a j quality
project, a loan amount bjt ≥ 0 and investment i
j











t)}+ (1− 1{it>0})nt (2.11)
where the index function 1{.} takes the value 1 if it > 0 (investor) and 0 if it ≤ 0
(non-investor). Thus, if an entrepreneur with a j ∈ {H,L} quality project invests,
he consumes and saves out of his profits from investment plus uninvested net worth.
If he does not invest, he consumes and saves out of his initial net worth nt. Hence,
non-investors may also exchange final goods for investment goods with banks for
saving purposes, as households do.
An entrepreneur who is still solvent after investment outcomes are realized
will compare the trade off between the benefit of consuming today and the cost of
foregoing future returns on internal funds. As entrepreneurs take as given the loan
rate and amount before making their investment decisions, we must consider the
bank’s problem prior to solving the entrepreneurs’ problem.
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2.2.5 Banks’ Problem
Banks are identical and should be thought of as capital mutual funds as in
CF, through which capital acquired by households and non-investors in exchange
for final goods becomes funding for investors to undertake projects.
In each period t, each bank enters into a loan contract with an entrepreneur
who has net worth nt, which is common knowledge, and who has project type
j ∈ {H,L}, which is private information.9 A loan contract can be structured either
to pool the two types or to separate them by using a costly screening technology.
A separating contract features screening of borrower types, and type specific
loan amounts and loan rates contingent on project outcomes. A separating loan
contract offered by the bank to an entrepreneur with net worth nt, who reports
his type to be j ∈ {H,L}, consists of a nonnegative loan rate and a nonnegative
loan amount pair (Rjt (xt), b
j
t), which maximizes expected profits π
e,j
t of the borrower






















limited liability. Note that an additional constraint is the participation constraint
πe,jt ≥ i
j
t − bt of the borrower, which may or may not be satisfied (trivially satisfied)
in a separating equilibrium.10,11
9Note that contracting takes place after the aggregate state is realized and firm production
occurs. Thus, nt is taken as given during contracting and there is no aggregate uncertainty.
10A subset of loan applicants might not find borrowing optimal at the offered contractual terms,
or banks may not supply loans for a subset of loan applicants.
11Note that costly screening reveals borrower types perfectly, so that an incentive constraint is
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In equation (2.12), the left hand side gives the expected return to the bank
from the loan in terms of final goods, which should exceed the cost of lending given
by the right hand side. The first term on the right hand side is the opportunity
cost of lending, which is simply the loan amount since the contracted loans are
intraperiod. The second term is the total cost of screening a borrower’s type, which
depends on the parameter µ, and which is convex in the loan amount and inversely
related to a borrower’s net worth.12 sjt ∈ {0, 1} identifies if a type j borrower is
screened, taking the value one if screening takes place and zero otherwise.13
A pooling contract offered by the bank does not involve screening, which im-
plies sHt = s
L
t = 0. A pooling contract consists of a common loan rate Rt(xt) =
RHt (xt) = R
L




t maximizing the joint ex-
pected profits απe,Ht +(1−α)π
e,L
t of the borrowers subject to the bank’s participation
constraint
α [pHRt(x̄t) + (1− pH)Rt(0)] bt + (1− α) [pLRt(x̄t) + (1− pL)Rt(0)] bt ≥ bt (2.13)
not necessary in this setup.
12Note that any functional form that is increasing in the leverage ratio bt/nt would work in this
setup as screening costs. This specific cost function, quadratic in the loan amount and decreasing in
borrower net worth, is chosen for analytical simplicity. Although just as ad hoc as the monitoring
costs used in CF/BGG models that are linearly increasing in net worth, this functional form
accounts for the fact that lenders become pickier as the loan amount to be disbursed rises, and
that smaller/younger firms (borrowers) with lower wealth are subject to higher agency costs in
credit markets.
13Note that the contract space is limited to pure strategies as in CF and BGG. Actually, it turns
out in this setup that lenders would choose to screen borrowers with probability one even when
randomization is allowed.
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and the participation constraints πe,jt ≥ i
j
t − bt for each type j ∈ {H,L}.
In equation (2.13), the left hand side gives the expected return to the bank
from the loan, consisting of the probability of lending to an investor with a high
quality project, which is α, times the expected repayment from a high type borrower
[pHRt(x̄t) + (1 − pH)Rt(0)]bt, plus the probability of lending to an investor with a
low quality project, which is 1− α, times the expected repayment from a low type
borrower, which is [pLRt(x̄t) + (1− pL)Rt(0)]bt. This return should exceed the loan
amount in the right hand side, which is simply the opportunity cost of the funds for
the bank.
Thus, banks’ problem is to find the equilibrium contract, either a separating or
a pooling contract, and to offer the equilibrium loan rates and amounts to borrowers
with net worth nt and a type j ∈ {H,L} project, which can be revealed or unrevealed
by the contract. Below we demonstrate that with risk neutral competitive banks,
the equilibrium contract is determined by high quality borrower preferences.
2.2.6 Solution to the Banks’ and Entrepreneurs’ Problems




t ), an entrepreneur with net worth nt
and a j type project has two independent decisions which are both linear: whether
to borrow (to invest) and whether to invest his net worth. An entrepreneur will
optimally borrow only if it is profitable, i.e. if qtp
j[x̄t − Rjt ]b
j
t ≥ 0. On the other
hand, he will optimally invest his net worth only if qtp
jx̄tnt ≥ nt, or qtpjx̄t ≥ 1.
For the banks, we will first characterize the equilibrium contract under sym-
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metric information, and then demonstrate how asymmetric information changes the
outcome.
Proposition 2.1. Under symmetric information, the equilibrium contract (bjt , R
j
t )
for j ∈ {H,L} satisfies RHt = 1qtpH <
1
qtpL
= RLt , and only high type entrepreneurs
borrow and undertake physical investment in the economy.




t to maximize a borrower’s expected














Competition yields zero profits for the bank (break even) so that it charges Rjt =
1
qtpj
for any positive amount of loans.14 Plugging this into borrower’s expected
return function and taking the derivative with respect to bjt yields the Kuhn-Tucker
condition qt ≤ 1pj x̄t (= if b
j








RLt , and since p





from the first order condition, so
that bHt > b
L
t = 0 and only high types borrow in equilibrium. Moreover, rearranging
the first order condition as qtp
Lx̄t < qtp
H x̄t = 1 we conclude that only high types
will invest their net worth, in which case low types may lend part of their net worth




14Technically, the break even constraint is [Rjt − 1qtpj ]b
j
t = 0. Thus, when b
j
t = 0, R
j
t > 0 is
indeterminate. In this case banks simply deny a loan for type j, and do not offer a loan rate. We
can equivalently say that banks would charge Rjt =
1
qtpj
for any positive loan amount but at this
loan rate the loan applicant chooses not to borrow so that bjt = 0 in equilibrium. This is the case
of price rationing.
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than the expected return pLx̄t on investment for the low types, so that they prefer
lending their net worth instead of investing it.
Corollary 2.1. Under symmetric information capital’s price would be qt =
1
pH x̄t
and the aggregate economy behaves like an economy with transformation rate pH x̄t.
Since high type entrepreneurs are the only ones to undertake physical invest-
ment in the economy, the transformation rate in the economy reflects their technol-
ogy. Note that the transformation rate is equal to the risk free return on deposits
in terms of investment goods.
When type is private information, low types would have an incentive to lie
about their types and borrow at RHt < R
L
t , which yields negative expected profits
to the banks. Thus, banks design contracts either by pooling the two types or
separating them using a costly screening technology to ensure nonnegative profits. If
types are sufficiently distinct from each other and/or the screening cost is sufficiently
low, equilibrium will entail separation as discussed below.
Proposition 2.2. Under asymmetric information, a pooling contract (bt, Rt) sat-
isfies Rt =
1




t , in which case both types may borrow to invest but only high types
would invest their net worth.
Proof. In a pooling contract, given qt and nt, a bank chooses bt and Rt to max-





H + (1− α)pL][x̄t −Rt]bt such that qt[αpH + (1− α)pL]Rtbt − bt ≥ 0
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Competition yields zero profits for a bank so that it charges Rt =
1
qt[αpH+(1−α)pL] on
loans. Plugging this into borrowers’ joint expected return function and taking the
derivative with respect to bt yields the Kuhn-Tucker condition qt ≤ 1[αpH+(1−α)pL]x̄t (= if bt > 0).
Thus, stipulating that bt > 0 in equilibrium we get qt =
1
[αpH+(1−α)pL]x̄t , in which
case we have Rt = x̄t and both types may borrow. Moreover, rearranging the first
order condition as qtp
Lx̄t < qt[αp
H + (1 − α)pL]x̄t = 1 < qtpH x̄t we see that only
high types will invest their net worth and low types will lend part of their net worth
to high types by saving in banks. Note that the risk free rate is still greater than
the expected return for low type investment.
Corollary 2.2. A pooling contract generates a pecuniary externality, since low types
do not internalize the effect of their borrowing on prices.
Borrowing of low types decreases the average transformation rate in the economy
since low types are using funds that otherwise would be invested by the more ef-
ficient high types. Thus, the lower transformation rate implies lower capital accu-
mulation, which yields lower income for the households and lower net worth for the
entrepreneurs in the next period.
In a separating contract banks would like to screen only borrowers who claim
to be high types, since only low types have an incentive to lie about their types.
Thus, sHt = 1 and s
L
t = 0 in a separating equilibrium.
Proposition 2.3. Under asymmetric information, a separating contract (bjt , R
j
t )








]. Under a separating






] ≡ qst , which yields a loan
74
amount bHt = [
qtpH x̄t−1
2µ




worth is also optimal for high types.

































any positive amount of loans. Plugging this into borrower’s expected return function






] (= if bjt > 0). Thus, given s
H
t = 1 and s
L










]. Moreover, stipulating that high types







]. Rearranging this, we calculate the optimal loan amount for
high types as bHt = [
qtpH x̄t−1
2µ












agents do not borrow and invest in a separating equilibrium.







] = qst , with








Lx̄t < 1 (or x̄t >
1
qtpL
= RLt ), so that low types would not borrow and would not
invest their net worth.
Assumption 2.1. Parameters are such that p
H
pL





With assumption 2.1, we stipulate that low type borrowers are denied a
loan/do not borrow in a separating equilibrium, as in the full information bench-
mark. Thus, a pooling contract would be preferable to a low type entrepreneur,




, µ and pH , we can set pL low enough to satisfy this condition.
Lemma 2.2. The equilibrium contract will be the contract preferred by high type
entrepreneurs.
If a pooling contact is preferred by both high and low type entrepreneurs,
the equilibrium contract will be a pooling contract. If a high type entrepreneur
prefers a separating contract, and a low type entrepreneur prefers a pooling contract,
the equilibrium contract will be a separating contract. Any deviation by a bank
from offering separating to pooling contracts will only attract low type borrowers,
invalidating pooling.
Lemma 2.3. Given qt and nt, a high type borrower prefers a separating contract over







where p̄ = [αpH + (1− α)pL].
Proof. A high type entrepreneur prefers a separating contract over a pooling contract
if it entails higher profits given qt and nt, i.e., qtp
H [x̄t − Rt]bt < qtpH [x̄t − RHt ]bHt ,
where Rt and R
H
t are as in Propositions 2.2 and 2.3, respectively.







With assumption 2.2, we guarantee the existence of a separating equilibrium
given qt and nt. Note that, given positive b
H
t and bt offered for some qt and nt, if
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we set pL low enough that p̄ approaches 1
qtx̄t







the condition in Assumption 2.2 is satisfied. Thus, the equilibrium will entail a
separating contract only if types are sufficiently distinct from each other (pH is high
enough relative to pL) and/or screening costs are sufficiently low (µ is sufficiently
low), and/or there are sufficiently many low type borrowers (α is sufficiently low, so
that p̄ is sufficiently low).
Proposition 2.4. Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, the equilibrium contract will
be a separating contract, in which investment is undertaken only by high type en-
trepreneurs.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 2.1 - 2.3.
In the remainder, we will proceed maintaining Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, by
which equilibrium entails separation and only high type entrepreneurs will borrow








qpt , a separating contract would be more efficient as it yields a higher transformation
rate. Rearranging qst < q
p






as a condition for separation to
be more efficient.15
15Under the parametrization used later, Assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and the efficiency condition will




Given that we have a separating equilibrium, in which investment is only
undertaken by high type entrepreneurs, the amount of final goods devoted to capital
formation (investment) by a high type entrepreneur will be determined by the sum
of his loan bHt = [
qtpH x̄t−1
2µ
]nt from the bank, as derived in Proposition 2.3, and his




t + nt yields
iHt (qt, nt) = [
qtp
H x̄t − 1
2µ
+ 1]nt (2.14)
which can be aggregated into total investment IHt by the help of linearity
IHt (qt, n
H





where nHt denotes the mean net worth holdings of high type borrowers and ηα is
the measure of high type borrowers in the economy. Thus, aggregate investment IHt
depends only on mean net worth holdings nHt of high type borrowers, and capital’s











which is the capital supply curve for the economy, that is upward sloping in qt.

























of their net worth, which we call the leverage ratio.
As discussed above, after investment outcomes are realized, entrepreneurs with
positive ex-post income yet given by equation (2.11) compare the trade off between
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the benefit of consuming today and the cost of foregoing the future return on internal
funds.16 The internal solution to this trade off is characterized by
qt = β
eEt [rt+1 + qt+1(1− δ)][ERt+1] (2.17)






t+1 −RHt+1bHt+1)] + (1− α)nt+1
nt+1
. (2.18)
This equation tells us that at time t + 1 an entrepreneur with net worth nt+1 will
have a high quality project with probability α, and in that case he will pour his net
worth into his project, which has an expected return of [qt+1p
H(x̄t+1it+1−RHt+1bHt+1)].
With probability 1−α he will have a low quality project and will keep his net worth
nt+1. Note that ERt+1 is greater than one, which incentivizes entrepreneurs to
postpone consumption and accumulate net worth. This may lead to complete self
financing. We assume entrepreneurs to be more impatient than households so that
entrepreneurial consumption will be high enough to ensure an ongoing need for
external financing (iHt > nt), since complete self financing would render the agency
costs irrelevant.17
Plugging the common leverage factor d̄t+1 =
iHt+1
nt+1
into equation (2.18), we have
ERt+1 = α [qt+1p
H(x̄t+1d̄t+1 −RHt+1(d̄t+1 − 1))] + (1− α) (2.19)
16See Appendix B.1 for an explicit statement and solution to this problem.
17Note that from the perspective of entrepreneurs, equation (2.17) need not hold with equality
as there may be corner solutions due to risk neutrality. However, we stipulate an internal solution
in equilibrium and compute the aggregate prices that support it.
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which implies that equation (2.17) is common to all solvent entrepreneurs since
ERt+1 is independent of individual net worth.
Finally, aggregating entrepreneurial budget constraints given by equations
(2.8) - (2.11) across all high and low types, we obtain
KHt+1 = ηαp








where Kjt denotes aggregate entrepreneurial capital stock for type j = H,L and
njt denotes average entrepreneurial net worth. Similarly, c
j
t now denotes average
entrepreneurial consumption with a slight abuse of notation. These aggregation
results suggest that one needs to keep track of only mean net worth holdings of each
type of entrepreneur to see how net worth affects the aggregate economy.
2.2.8 Equilibrium
Assuming a linear investment technology makes it simple to aggregate over
entrepreneurs with considerable net worth heterogeneity since only mean net worth
holdings of each type of entrepreneur affect the aggregate economy. Thus, we con-
sider a high type entrepreneur who holds the average level of net worth among all
high type entrepreneurs, and a low type entrepreneur who holds the average level of
net worth among all low type entrepreneurs, together with the representative house-
hold, firm and bank in this economy. Letting small letters other than prices indicate
population averages and capital letters indicate aggregate amounts, a competitive
equilibrium is defined as below:
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Competitive Equilibrium A competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of



































t , qt and a set of





t , zt, x̄t), such that
1. Given prices rt, wt and qt, the representative household optimally chooses ct,
lt and kt+1 to solve the households’ problem;
2. Given prices rt, w
e
t , qt and R
j
t for a type j ∈ {H,L} entrepreneur and the
productivity state x̄t, the j type entrepreneur holding the mean net worth n
j
t






t) optimally to solve the entrepreneurs’ problem;
3. Given prices rt, wt and w
e
t , and the aggregate state zt, the representative firm
chooses Kt+1, Ht and H
e
t to solve the firms’ problem;
4. Given capital’s price qt, productivity state x̄t and the mean net worth holdings





sjt to solve the banks’ problem;
5. Consumption goods, investment goods and labor markets clear:
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Yt = ztF (Kt, Ht, H
e
t )









[Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt] = ηαpH x̄tiHt + η(1− α)pLx̄tiLt
Ht = (1− η)lt
Het = η;




KLt = η(1− α)kLt
Kt −KHt −KLt = (1− η)kt.






t = 0 in the equilibrium contract,
the competitive equilibrium for this economy is characterized by twelve equations




t+1, Ht (or (1− η)lt), ct, cHt , cLt , nHt , nLt , iHt , RHt ,





qtuc(t) = βEtuc(t+ 1)[zt+1FK(t+ 1) + qt+1(1− δ)] (2.23)




Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + ηαpH x̄tiHt (2.25)
(1− η)ct + ηα(cHt + iHt + µ
(iHt − nHt )2
nHt
) + η(1− α)cLt = ztF (t) (2.26)














nHt = ztFη(t) +
KHt
ηα
[ztFK(t) + qt(1− δ)] (2.29)
nLt = ztFη(t) +
KLt
η(1− α)


























− 1)] + (1− α)}
(2.33)
2.2.9 Solution Methodology
Given the deterministic steady state implied by the equations characterizing
the equilibrium, model parameters are set to match various empirical regularities
and microeconomic findings for the U.S. economy. Equilibrium equations are log-
linearized by transforming the variables to represent percentage deviations from
steady state. Decision rules are computed by the method of undetermined coeffi-
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cients using the Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) algorithm.
Parametrization A period in the model is a quarter. Household preferences are
given by u(c, 1− l) = log(c) + ν(1− l), where ν = 2.8 is chosen so that l = 0.3 and
work hours account for 30 percent of household time endowment in steady state.
We set β = 0.99, implying a 4 percent annual real rate of interest.
Consumption good production technology is Cobb-Douglas with a capital
share of 36 percent, a household labor share of 63.99 percent, and an entrepreneurial
labor share of 0.01 percent. Entrepreneurial labor is needed to ensure a positive net
worth in each period, which is essential in the financial contract. The labor share
for entrepreneurs is set to an arbitrarily small number, so that the model with µ = 0
collapses to a standard RBC model. The capital depreciation rate is set to δ = 0.02.
We set the probability of success for a high type entrepreneur to be pH = 99.75
percent, implying an annual bankruptcy rate of 1 percent. This value is consistent
with the quarterly failure rate for the U.S. businesses reported in Fisher (1999)
using the Dun-Bradstreet dataset over the period 1984-1994, which is 0.974 percent.
The measure of entrepreneurs, η, has no effect on the steady state output ratios in
the model economy. Thus, we set η = 0.5, which is a simple normalization. The
measure of high type entrepreneurs, α, turns out to affect only the high and low
type shares of the steady state output ratios of entrepreneurial aggregates, given
a constant total entrepreneurial share as determined by other model parameters.
Thus, we also set α = 0.5 as a simple normalization.18
18Note that η and α can be set to match the corresponding actual measures for entrepreneurs
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We set screening parameter µ to 0.5 percent to match a leverage ratio (ratio of
debt over equity, b/n) of around 1. This is the value implied by 1987-2009 quarterly
data for the U.S. non-financial business sector as calculated in Chugh (2010). This
value of leverage implies a 0.03 percent share of total screening costs in output.
Finally we define βe = γβ, where γ = 99.25 percent is set to match an annual risk
premium of 3 percent, given by Rq − 1 in the model economy. Thus, entrepreneurs
discount the future more heavily than do households, which ensures external financ-
ing (i > n) in equilibrium. Complete self financing is not an interesting case since
it eliminates agency costs as discussed above.
For the investment specific productivity process x̄t, we assume that trans-
formed investment specific productivity follows an AR(1) process
x̂t = φx̂t−1 + et (2.34)
where et ∼ N(0, s2), φ = 0.95 and s = 0.01, and where x̂t = log( x̄tx̄ ) and long run
average x̄ is set to be equal to 1/pH , so that the model with µ = 0 collapses to a
standard RBC model with a one-to-one transformation rate, i.e., capital’s price is
unity.
Transformed aggregate productivity is assumed to follow an AR(1) process
ẑt = ρẑt−1 + εt (2.35)
where εt ∼ N(0, σ2), ρ = 0.95 and σ = 0.01, and where ẑt = log( ztz ) and the long
run average is z = 1.
in the U.S. economy as well, but this is irrelevant to the aggregate outcomes of the model.
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Steady State Given the parametrization above, the average high type entrepreneur’s
steady state consumption share c
H
nH
is around 5 percent, and the average low type
entrepreneur’s steady state consumption share c
L
nL
is around 7 percent. The internal
rate of return in the steady state is 1
γ
− 1 = 0.75 percent and the steady state price
of capital is q = 1.01.19 Household consumption is about 76 percent of output and
investment is about 23.7 percent of output in the steady state.
2.3 Results
In this section we present and discuss the impulse responses of the model
economy to aggregate and investment specific productivity shocks respectively, and
make comparisons to the CF and BGG models.
Figure 2.1 presents the behavior of households, entrepreneurs and the aggre-
gate economy in response to a σ = 1 percent unexpected increase in aggregate
productivity from its steady state level.20 We will discuss the impact effect first and
then discuss the dynamics.
When aggregate productivity rises, increases in the marginal product of labor
and the marginal product of capital pull up factor prices. As a result, households
19Given that in the steady state q = 1.01, b
H
nH
= 1 and x̄ = 1
pH
, and assuming pH = 99.75%
and α = 0.5, setting pL ≤ 97.75% so that p̄ ≤ 98.75% satisfies Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 and the
efficiency condition.
20Household labor approximates aggregate labor since entrepreneurial labor share is negligible
and fixed. High type and low type entrepreneurial behavior should be interpreted as the behavior
of the entrepreneurs with the average level of net worth among all high type and low type project
holders respectively.
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Costly Screening Model (–), Standard RBC Model (- -)
Figure 2.1: Model Economy’s Response to an Aggregate Productivity Shock
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become wealthier and would like to increase both consumption and savings. So
consumption increases on impact and investment demand also increases, which leads
to increased household lending. Increased investment demand pulls up capital’s
price. Moreover the increase in wages encourages more labor supply as there is no
income effect on labor supply. As aggregate capital is predetermined, output follows
the behavior of labor and increases on impact. Note that household consumption
rises more on impact compared to a standard RBC model, as the impact increase
in capital’s price encourages more consumption.
On the entrepreneurs side, increased factor prices increase entrepreneurial net
worth, but since capital is predetermined, the rise in net worth on impact is limited.
Increased lending by households increases the leverage ratio of the average high type
entrepreneur as net worth rises modestly, while the loan amount rises more than net
worth does. Entrepreneurial investment also increases on impact as both net worth
and loans increase. Meanwhile, the increase in the expected future capital price
decreases current consumption and increases saving for high types as the return on
internal funds rises. As for the low type entrepreneurs, the wealth effect (increase
in net worth) makes them increase both consumption and saving on impact as was
the case for households.
We see that the movements in aggregate labor, output and investment in
response to a positive aggregate productivity shock display propagation of this shock
over time. This results from the delayed peak response of high type entrepreneurial
net worth to increased productivity, which increases capital’s price and the return
on internal funds on impact. As saving of high types increases sharply on impact
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to exploit the increased internal return, next period’s net worth increases sharply.
But after the initial period, capital’s price starts declining and net worth starts
increasing less. After the price of capital goes back to its steady state level, net
worth starts declining and eventually tracks the movement of productivity as in a
standard RBC model.21
Investment mainly follows the movement of high type net worth. After its
initial increase, household consumption displays a reverse hump, mimicking the
movement in capital’s price and reflecting the hump-shaped behavior in investment.
An increase in investment supply must be accompanied by an increase in savings
supply (or investment demand) by households and a resulting decrease in household
consumption. As consumption decreases after the initial impact, labor supply in-
creases more, pulling consumption up again in the next period. Then labor supply
starts falling gradually, displaying a hump-shaped behavior overall, which is followed
by output. Five quarters after the initial impact, net worth effects seem to disap-
pear and the economy starts tracking the persistent productivity shock towards the
steady state as in a standard RBC model.
High type consumption rises after its initial decline due to the spike in en-
trepreneurial savings. As the internal return to investment gradually falls, en-
trepreneurial savings decline and consumption picks up. Low type consumption also
shows a hump-like shape, as low types de-accumulate capital and thereby decrease
their net worth, saving less for future investment, lending more to high types and
21See appendix B.2 to see the effect of an aggregate productivity shock on capital’s price qt as
well as the amount of investment in a supply/demand diagram.
89
consuming the proceeds. Aggregate consumption is a weighted average of household
and entrepreneurial consumption, overall showing a hump-shaped behavior as well.
Impulse responses to an aggregate productivity shock in the model show both
qualitative and quantitative parallels with the CF model.22 As a matter of fact,
both models also share a drawback: the risk premium, i.e., the difference between
the risky loan rate and the riskless return, is procyclical in both models whereas the
data shows the opposite. The risk premium in the model is given by RHq−1. Since
the contract is intraperiod, the riskless return for the supplied funds is 1, whereas
the risky loan rate is RH in terms of investment goods, the price of which is q. A
positive productivity shock raises the price of capital q and lowers the loan rate RH
on impact, as can be seen from the impulse responses. The increase in q offsets the
decrease in RH , and RHq increases slightly on impact (less than 0.1 percent increase
from its steady state level). Thus, the risk premium RHq − 1 increases.23
Figure 2.2 presents the behavior of households, entrepreneurs and the aggre-
gate economy in response to a 1 percent unexpected increase in investment specific
productivity from its steady state level.
When investment productivity rises, the transformation rate in the economy
rises, facilitating more capital production and pulling down the price of capital.
A fall in the price of capital increases the relative price of consumption, which
makes households consume less and save more on impact. Household labor increases
22See Appendix B.3 for the impulse responses to a productivity shock in the CF model.
23It is also clear by Equation (2.27) that the risk premium RHq is increasing in the leverage
ratio b/n, which is procyclical.
90
Costly Screening Model (–), Standard RBC Model (- -)
Figure 2.2: Model Economy’s Response to an Investment Productivity Shock
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on impact to be able to supply more funds and sustain future consumption. As
aggregate capital is predetermined, output follows the behavior of labor supply and
increases on impact.
As the price of capital falls due to higher investment productivity, entrepreneurial
net worth falls on impact because of the decreased value of accumulated capital.
However, increased household savings lead to higher loan amounts, which increases
high type investment on impact despite a lower net worth. After investment takes
place, high type entrepreneurs decrease consumption and increase savings on im-
pact, in order to exploit higher future returns from investment. Note that increased
investment and savings pull net worth up in subsequent periods for high type en-
trepreneurs.24 As for the low type entrepreneurs, they lend more to high types
and therefore increase consumption in response to increased investment produc-
tivity. Aggregate consumption decreases on impact, as households and high type
entrepreneurs decrease consumption.
Note that as net worth falls but borrowing rises, the leverage ratio rises again,
pulling up the risk premium as before. The investment productivity shock decreases
the price of capital q but raises the loan rate RH on impact as can be seen from
the impulse responses. The decrease in q is offset by the increase in RH , and RHq
increases slightly on impact (less than 0.1 percent increase from its steady state
level). Thus, the risk premium RHq − 1 increases.
As before, investment follows the path of investors’ net worth and household
24See appendix B.2 to see the effect of an investment productivity shock on capital’s price qt as
well as the amount of investment in a supply/demand diagram.
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consumption follows the path of capital’s price in the periods following the shock.
Five quarters after the initial impact, net worth effects seem to disappear and the
economy starts tracking the persistent productivity shock towards the steady state
as in a standard RBC model.
2.3.1 Discussion
The main reason for the counterfactual behavior of risk premium in these
models is that net worth cannot fully respond to shocks immediately, since loan
contracts are intraperiod and there is no aggregate uncertainty during contracting.
As discussed above, a positive productivity shock raises factor prices and capital’s
price, which lead to a modest rise in the value of net worth as the capital stock is
predetermined. But loan amounts rise more than proportionally to net worth as
a result of increased demand for investment goods. Thus, total investment rises
with the increased loans, but the internal financing rate falls. A larger share of the
total investment is now financed externally, so the leverage ratio increases. Thus,
bankruptcy risk in the CF model increases, which drives the risk premium up. In
the screening model, bankruptcy risk is constant but higher leverage leads to greater
screening and therefore a higher risk premium.
BGG also assumes monitoring costs, but contracts in BGG are interperiod
and the aggregate state of the economy affects contracting. A positive productivity
shock increases net worth more than the loan amount, so leverage and bankruptcy
risk falls, implying a countercyclical risk premium. In CF and screening models,
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the delayed response of net worth after a positive productivity shock leads to a
counterfactual procyclical movement in the risk premium, but it is this delay that
gives rise to propagation (hump-shaped behavior) in aggregate variables. In BGG,
propagation is achieved by price stickiness and exogenous delays in investment, and
agency costs mainly amplify the shocks. In CF there is no amplification, but agency
costs do propagate the shocks over time.
The challenge is to set up a model of unsecured lending in which levels and
movements in the leverage ratio, risk premium, loan rates and loan amounts are
in line with the data, and in which the model matches the dynamics of the key
macroeconomic variables and features both amplification and propagation of ag-
gregate shocks as in the data. In addition, the underlying assumptions for credit
markets, such as the motivation for agency costs, should be empirically plausible so
that the model predictions are reliable. Ex-ante borrower heterogeneity and screen-
ing of loan applicants, which results in type specific price and quantity setting for
loans, are realistic and therefore a promising candidate for motivating agency costs
in unsecured lending.
In this simple model with credit market imperfections, we can see that one
advantage of the screening framework over the monitoring framework is that wealth
effects could induce more persistent dynamics during adverse economic conditions,
when borrower screening is more likely. Lenders choose to screen borrowers only
when i) screening technology is cheap, ii) borrower qualities are distinct enough so
that screening out good borrowers yields efficiency gains, iii) high quality borrowers
are scarce and screening them out eliminates the cross subsidization of low quality
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borrowers, which all depend on model parameters. The model is solved locally with
parameters ensuring the screening outcome, which makes loan terms and in turn
investment dependent on borrower net worth, resulting in persistent wealth effects.
However, when there is less uncertainty about the quality of borrowers, and when low
quality borrowers are scarce as could happen under favorable economic conditions,
lenders would choose to pool borrowers instead of screening them out, eliminating
net worth effects. In this case, the economy would behave the same as a standard
RBC model as shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2; however, the economy’s steady state
investment, output and consumption levels would be lower than the first best since
pooling leads to a decrease in the aggregate investment productivity (economy’s
transformation rate). Thus, net worth effects that induce persistent investment and
output dynamics tend to occur especially in bad times, which makes economic busts
deeper and longer than booms.
2.4 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to analyze the effects of a particular agency problem
– ex-ante asymmetric information in credit markets and costly screening of loan
applicants – on the dynamics of key macroeconomic and financial measures. We
examine how aggregate shocks are amplified and propagated through net worth
effects in a model of ex-ante screening costs compared to a standard model of ex-
post monitoring costs, in particular the model by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). The
principal contribution is to show that screening costs in credit markets can generate
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net worth effects that are qualitative and quantitatively similar to those generated
by the more commonly assumed monitoring costs. Moreover, the screening model
generates type specific loan terms endogenously and enables researchers to study
many issues prevailing in actual bank lending practices, such as risk pricing and
credit rationing.
In terms of future research, this model can be extended to endogenize the
measure of low and high type projects to reflect the “tightness” of good projects
associated with the aggregate state of the economy. As good projects start domi-
nating the economy, say because of a large positive productivity shock, we expect
pooling to be optimal since the total cost of screening would be high; however, when
bad projects become more common, we expect separation to be optimal. Thus, one
would get an asymmetric loan term setting outcome in credit markets; in good times
lenders are less selective in making loans, while in bad times they are pickier, as one
would expect to find in the data. This may explain how high risk borrowers become
overindebted in good times, which has severe consequences when the economy busts.
Another extension could be including collateral constraints in this adverse selection
environment, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and letting collateral values be the
tools to separate the types instead of assuming a costly screening technology. Thus,
high types self select by choosing high collateral and low interest rates, whereas low
types select low collateral and high interest rates. Thus, fluctuations in collateral
values through asset price movements can both amplify and propagate the effect
of productivity shocks as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), in addition to generating




Proof of Proposition 1.1: Competition yields zero profits (1.4) for the bank. Sub-
stituting (1.4) in (1.1) and maximizing we have
max
ij
qeγ̄f(ij)− (1 + r)ij → f ′(ij) = 1 + r
qeγ̄
Proof of Proposition 1.2: Incentive compatibility constraints are given by
ICG : qeγ̄f(iG)− [pGRGiG + (1− pG)ce,G(1 + r)iG] ≥
qeγ̄f(iB)− [pGRBiB + (1− pG)ce,B(1 + r)iB]
ICB : qeγ̄f(iB)− [pBRBiB + (1− pB)ce,B(1 + r)iB] ≥
qeγ̄f(iG)− [pBRGiG + (1− pB)ce,G(1 + r)iG]
which, plugging in the break even conditions, become






− 1)ce,B](1 + r)iB
⇒ qeγ̄f(iG)− (1 + r)iG ≥ qeγ̄f(iB)− (1 + r)iB − [p
G
pB
− 1][1− ce,B](1 + r)iB







⇒ qeγ̄f(iB)− (1 + r)iB︸ ︷︷ ︸
Πe,B,s





][1− ce,G](1 + r)iG
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− 1][1 − ce,B]iB ≥ [1 − pB
pG







, which is satisfied
as long as iG ≤ iB. In this case, since a good type has no incentive mimicking a bad
type, the bad type contract is not distorted. However, binding ICB characterizes
the good type contract together with (1.4). Note that given iB, Πe,G,s decreases in
iG for any given ce,G < 1, implying iG < iB.
Proof of Proposition 1.3: Expected profits λΠe,G,p + (1− λ)Πe,B,p of the borrower
pool is
qeγ̄f(i)− λ[pGRi+ (1− pG)ce(1 + r)i]− (1− λ)[pBRi+ (1− pB)ce(1 + r)i]
= qeγ̄f(i)− [p̄Ri+ (1− p̄)ce(1 + r)i] = qeγ̄f(i)− (1 + r)i
where the last equality follows from substituting in the break even condition (1.10)
for the pool. Maximizing for i yields f ′(i) = 1+r
qeγ̄
.
Proof of Lemma 1.3: See the below proof.
Proof of Propositions 1.4 - 1.5: Proposition 1.4 follows from Lemmas 1.1 - 1.3.
Lemma 1.3 makes use of f(ι) = ιθ and θf(iB) = f ′(iB)iB = 1+r
qeγ̄
iB. Dividing
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Proof of Proposition 1.6: Regardless of the lending regime, total savings is equal


































The second inequality follows from ( i
B
i
)θ = [λ i
G
iB
+ (1 − λ)]−θ and the concavity of
f(ι) = ιθ, which implies [λ i
G
iB
+ (1− λ)]θ > [λ( iG
iB
)θ + (1− λ)].
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Now if we show that [λ( i
G
iB




1−α , the last equation implies
rst < r
p
t . Since α ∈ (0, 1) and 1−θα1−α is strictly increasing in α (at rate 1 − θ), RHS
attains its maximum at α = 0, in which case RHS<LHS. Thus, RHS<LHS for all







1−θ > 1, we must have iG < i < iB for
Is = Ip to hold.




















































































− 1) = 0 (A.1)






















































)] > 1 and (iG/iB)θ−1 > 1, implying ICiG/iB > 0. We also









The derivative of [1−c
e,G]


















































1−θ [1 − (i
G/iB)θ−1] < 0, implying that the cost of




− 1][1 − γ0
γ̄θ
]
by (1.16), we compute ∂Cp/∂(γ0/γ̄) < 0 and ∂Cp/∂θ > 0. We need to show


















The positive sign of the last term follows from ∂(i
G/iB)θ
∂θ
< 0 holding iG/iB < 1
constant.
Proof of Proposition 1.9: Let the first group of loan applicants has measure η and
productivity γ̄1, and the second group of loan applicants has measure 1 − η and
productivity γ̄2. Let the second group be subject to higher agency costs (low quality
group), so that lower collateralization switches the regime from pooling to separating
for the second group first. Consider the case in which low risk borrowers within the
second group are indifferent between pooling and separating contracts. That is, the
economy is at a regime switching point where lending regime switches from pooling
borrowers within both groups (pp regime), to pooling borrowers within the first
group and separating borrowers within the second group (ps regime).
In this case, regardless of the lending regime, total savings is equal to total
investment in projects. Thus, S(A, k) = Ips = Ipp. We compute
Ipp = ηipp1 + (1− η)i
pp




Ips = ηips1 + (1− η)λiG2 + (1− η)(1− λ)iB2 = [η + (1− η)[λ
iG2
iB2











1−θ by Lemma 1.3. Similarly, given












































which proves that the proportion of high quality loans (type 1) increases when the
economy switches from pooling to separating low quality borrowers (type 2). For
parts ii-iv we follow the same steps in the proof of Proposition 1.6.
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A.2 Equilibrium Conditions
Let j ∈ {p, s} denote pooling or separating regimes. Given kt, aggregate
household savings and consumption satisfy
St = wt, C
H,j














1−θ , cet+1 =
γ0
γ̄θ








1−θ , ce,Bt+1 =
γ0
γ̄θ






































t + (1− λ)iBt
Kst+1 = γ̄[λf(i
G





t )− (1 + rst )iGt ] + (1− λ)[qst+1γ̄f(iBt )− (1 + rst )iBt ]
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A.3 Regime switching when θ is low
In this section we analyze how exogenous changes in the collateral capacity of
investors affect the allocation of credit across investors with different unobservable
risk levels, under the assumption that the curvature of investment technology is
high, i.e., θ is relatively low. In this case, lower collateralization increases pooling
incentives unlike in Section 1.6; however, increases the degree of rationing for a low
risk borrower under a separating regime as before.
(a) Initially Pooling (b) Initially Separating
Figure A.1: An increase in γ0 given γ̄, for relatively low θ
Figure A.1 illustrates the possible effects of a decrease in γ0 given γ̄ at time
T on aggregate investment, when θ is relatively low. Panel (a) shows that, if the
lending regime is initially pooling, a decrease in γ0 will not change the composition
of credit since the regime continues to be pooling. In this case, lower collateralization
increases the pooling loan rate, reallocating profits from low risk borrowers to high
risk borrowers.
Panel (b) shows that, if the lending regime is initially separating, a decrease
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in γ0 may change the composition of credit in opposing ways, either by increasing
the degree of rationing iB/iG, or switching the regime into pooling. In the first
case, the growth path moves from S to S ′ as the credit is reallocated from low risk
borrowers to high risk borrowers. In the second case, rationing becomes so high that
the regime switches to pooling with a greater degree of cross subsidization, moving
the economy from S to P ′. Although lower collateralization paradoxically creates a
boom, a decrease in collateralization increases the inequality in profit distribution.
One thing to note here is that, although higher collateralization increases
screening incentives when θ is low, and a rise in collateralization may switch the
lending regime from pooling to separating, reallocating credit from low risk borrow-
ers to high risk borrowers, the inefficiency arising in aggregate investment could be
minimal in this case, as higher collateralization brings pooling and separating loan
terms closer. As collateralization approaches one, the separating regime coincides
with the pooling regime.
Figure A.2 illustrates the possible effects of an increase in γ̄ given γ0 at time
T on aggregate investment, when θ is relatively low. In this case, a decrease in
collateralization increases pooling incentives and may change the composition of
credit by reallocating credit from low risk to high risk borrowers, or vice versa.
If the lending regime is initially pooling, an increase in γ̄ would keep the
composition of credit unchanged, although lower collateralization would redistribute
profits from low risk borrowers to high risk borrowers. Panel (a) shows that, in this
case the growth path shifts from P to P ′, where investment is still efficient at a
higher productivity level, but the inequality between the profits of high and low risk
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(a) Initially Pooling (b) Initially Separating
Figure A.2: An increase in γ̄ given γ0, for relatively low θ
borrowers is higher.
Panel (b) shows that, if the lending regime is initially separating, an increase
in γ̄ would either increase the degree of rationing iB/iG under a separating regime or
switch the lending regime into pooling and reallocate credit from high risk borrowers
to low risk borrowers. In the latter case, the growth path shifts from S to P ′,
where investment becomes more efficient at a higher productivity level, although
the inequality between the profits of high and low risk borrowers becomes higher.
In the former case, the separating regime carries on, but the growth path may shift
up or down depending on whether the opposing composition or productivity effects
dominate. The growth path shifts down from S to SL when the composition effect
dominates, while it shifts up from S to SH when the productivity effect dominates.
Therefore, when expected investment specific productivity is high, if collateralization
is not kept equally high, inequality between the profits of high and low risk borrowers
may rise and aggregate investment may fall as before.
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A.4 Granger causality test results
Do lagged values of the proportion of risky loans made by banks help predict
current fluctuations in real GDP? To test this, we use quarterly real GDP data
(GDPC96) and quarterly data on the total value of loans for all C&I loans made by
all commercial banks (EVANQ) in the sample of FRB’s Survey on Terms of Business
Lending, together with the total value of C&I loans made to moderate (EVAMNQ)
and acceptable (EVAONQ) risk groups categorized by sample banks for the period
1997/2 to 2012/2. All data series are obtained from FRED.
We define RISKY as the proportion of moderate and high (acceptable) risk
C&I loans, and we use the log of real GDP series, to conduct the following test
log(RGDP )t = c+
L∑
i=1
αi log(RGDP )t−i +
L∑
i=1
βi RISKYt−i + ut
H0 : β1 = β2 = ... = βL = 0
The table below reports the p-values for rejecting the null hypothesis for lag
lengths between 1 to 8 (quarters). Accordingly, decreases in the lagged values of
the proportion of risky loans are highly predictive of current reductions in real GDP.
L 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8




An entrepreneur starts period t with accumulated capital ket . After the firm




t [rt + qt(1− δ)]. Then he draws a
high (low) type investment project with probability α (1−α), the success probability
of which is pH (pL). If he is a high type, he is allowed to borrow bHt at rate R
H
t .
If he is a low type, he does not borrow or invest. But he may lend part of his net
worth. After investment outcomes are realized, all entrepreneurs maximize lifetime
utility given by equation (2.7) subject to budget constraint given by equations (2.8)
and (2.11).
The value function of an entrepreneur with a j ∈ {H,L} type project is given by
V (ket , j) = max
ket+1, ct
ct + β












]nt if high type
nt if low type
(B.2)




t /nt are all functions of parameters and qt. Thus,
they are constants from the perspective of an entrepreneur. Solving for ct in (B.2)
and plugging it in (B.1), the first order condition with respect to ket+1 (which is the
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same for both type of entrepreneurs) and the Envelope conditions are calculated as
qt = β
e[αpHV ′(ket+1, H) + (1− α)V ′(ket+1, L)] (B.3)







V ′(ket , L) = [rt + qt(1− δ)] (B.5)
Updating (B.4) and (B.5) by one period and plugging them into (B.3) we get
qt = β






) + (1− α)] (B.6)
which is equivalent to equations (2.17)-(2.19) in the text.
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B.2 Supply and Demand Curves for Investment
In this section we graph the investment supply and demand curves to illustrate
how different shocks affect the capital’s price qt as well as the amount of investment.
Investment (capital) supply in the economy is given by equation (2.16), which
can be re-written as
ISt (qt, n
H








H x̄t − 1
2µ
+ 1]nHt (B.7)
We can see that the supply of capital ISt is upward sloping in qt and it shifts up in
nHt , or equivalently zt, and x̄t.
1 On the other hand, the capital demand curve of
households is given by the Euler equation
qtuc(t) = βEtuc(t+ 1)[rt+1 + qt+1(1− δ)] (B.8)
which is downward sloping in qt, and similar to the supply curve, shifts up in zt.
As the price qt of capital rises, the relative price of current consumption falls and
the household optimally increases current consumption and decreases savings, which
curbs the household demand for capital. On the other hand, an increase in aggregate
productivity zt yields a positive income effect on household consumption and saving,
1Note that high type entrepreneurs do not acquire capital through financial intermediaries.
Thus, the capital supplied to non-investors is effectively ISt − [KHt + 1 − (1 − δ)KHt ], where the
latter term is high type entrepreneurs’ net capital acquisitions. Equivalently, we can deduce the
capital supplied to households as ISt − [KHt+1 +KLt+1− (1− δ)(KHt +KLt )]. In the supply/demand
analysis, we will neglect the capital acquisitions by entrepreneurs for simplicity, and treat ISt as
the approximate value of the capital supplied to households.
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shifting out the capital demand curve of households.
Figure B.1: Capital Supply and Demand after an Aggregate Productivity Shock
Figure B.1 illustrates the movements in the capital (investment) demand and
supply curves, together with the capital’s price and the level of investment in re-
sponse to a positive aggregate productivity shock. A positive aggregate productivity
shock raises wages and rental rates, which lead to a rise in household income, raising
desired savings and shifting the investment demand curve out. In the meantime,
entrepreneurial income and net worth also rise modestly, shifting the investment
supply curve up a little, as capital stock is predetermined and entrepreneurial wages
are small (see the blue curves). Thus, on impact the economy moves from point 1
to point 2 as shown in the graph, increasing both the level of investment and the
price of capital. An increase in the expected future price of capital increases the
return on internal funds, which raises high type entrepreneurial savings on impact,
increasing the entrepreneurial net worth further in the next period, shifting the in-
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vestment supply curve up even more. On the demand side, the investment demand
curve follows the movement in aggregate productivity, shifting back down slowly
together with the persistent productivity shock (see the red curves). Thus, in the
period(s) following the shock the economy moves from point 2 to point 3 as shown
in the graph, consistent with the movements in investment and the price of capital
as shown in Figure 2.1. Accordingly, investment keeps increasing for a couple of
periods after its initial increase on impact, showing a hump-shaped behavior. Both
the level of investment and the price of capital return back to their steady state
levels as the supply and demand curves keep shifting down together with the falling
aggregate productivity.
Figure B.2: Capital Supply and Demand after an Investment Productivity Shock
Figure B.2 illustrates the movements in the capital (investment) demand and
supply curves, together with the capital’s price and the level of investment in re-
sponse to a positive investment productivity shock. A positive investment produc-
tivity shock raises the current return on investment, shifting up the investment
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supply curve, which moves the economy from point 1 to point 2 as shown in the
graph. Thus, given the demand for investment, the price of capital falls and the
level of investment rises. In the meantime, a positive investment productivity shock
also raises the expected future return on investment, which increases entrepreneurial
savings and raises entrepreneurial net worth in the next period(s). The rise in en-
trepreneurial net worth further shifts the investment supply curve up, increasing
the level of investment and decreasing the price of capital even more, moving the
economy from point 2 to point 3, in line with the movements in aggregate invest-
ment and capital’s price as shown in Figure 2.2. Both the level of investment and
the price of capital return back to their steady state levels as the supply curve shifts
back down together with the decrease in investment productivity.
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B.3 Impulse Responses of the CF Model
Figure B.3: The Response to a Productivity Shock in the CF Model
Figure B.3 is borrowed from CF, showing the impulse responses of the costly
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monitoring model and a standard RBC model to a 1% increase in aggregate produc-
tivity from its steady state level.2 We see that the impulse responses of the costly
screening model shown in Figure 2.1 matches those of the costly monitoring model
shown in Figure B.3 both qualitatively and quantitatively.3
2Note that in the original Figure 2 of CF each panel contains the dynamics of three different
models: 1) A standard RBC model in which agency costs are set to zero, 2) An RBC model with
agency costs, and 3) An RBC model with agency costs, in which net worth is held constant, which
is isomorphic to a standard cost-of-adjustment model. The third model’s impulse responses are
not shown in Figure B.3 to simplify comparison to Figure 2.1.
3Entrepreneurial net worth and consumption in Figure B.3 should be compared to high type
net worth and consumption in Figure 2.1.
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